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A STORM IS BREWING: HOW FEDERAL 
AMBIVALENCE REGARDING BELOW-COST 
PRICING TURNS A BLIND EYE TO 
MONOPOLY RISK IN THE BEER MARKET 
Daniel Croxall*
           Large beer manufacturers, known colloquially as “Big Beer,” 
have been steadily losing market share to small, independent craft 
breweries. Big Beer wants it market share back, and in some cases will 
go to great lengths to try to defend its dominance—even anticompetitive 
conduct. Below-cost pricing is one avenue that presents a risk to 
independent craft breweries. This Article examines how Big Beer can 
manipulate the beer market in its favor by engaging in predatory pricing. 
Further, this Article proposes a solution that could be implemented on a 
nation-wide scale to curtail Big Beer’s anticompetitive activities with 
respect to pricing. 
  
 
 * Associate Professor at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Professor 
of the world’s first craft-beer law course. I would like to thank Thomas Gerhart for his invaluable 
research, editing, contributions, and friendship. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in 1890, the United States began a nearly fifty-year 
campaign against big business that waged war on two fronts: antitrust 
and prohibition.1 Regarding antitrust, the federal government passed a 
series of legislation that created liability for anticompetitive 
behaviors.2 During this same period, the United States also amended 
the Constitution to prohibit—then later permit—the manufacture, sale, 
and transportation of alcohol within the country.3 These two battles 
have a great deal of overlap because they had the same purpose—to 
prevent a large company from monopolizing a market and, 
consequently, harming consumers.4 Today, the war rages on—129 
years after it began. Large companies, especially in the beer market, 
employ creative means to develop monopolies; the judiciary does not 
have a prevailing method to evaluate these activities, and the federal 
government’s approach to some monopolistic practices is 
reactionary—not preventative. 
Large companies have a litany of tools available that give them a 
market advantage over smaller competitors. One such method, which 
can create a monopoly by strangling smaller manufacturers from the 
market, is predatory pricing.5 The United States Supreme Court 
defined predatory pricing as “pricing below an appropriate measure of 
cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors . . . and reducing 
competition in the long run.”6 Below-cost pricing, also known as loss-
leader pricing, is an amorphous concept because the Supreme Court 
never defined the phrase “an appropriate measure of cost.”7 This 
phrase’s fluid definition has resulted in each circuit court developing 
 
 1. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) 
(noting that the Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted in 1890); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ratified on 
Dec. 5, 1933). 
 2. See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 1 (explaining that Congress enacted the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890, the Clayton Act in 1914, and the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936). 
 3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (completing ratification on Jan. 29, 1919), repealed by 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ratified on Dec. 5, 1933). 
 4. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE LIQUOR LEGISLATION 20, 22, 25 (1941). 
 5. Louis D. Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices: The Competition That Kills, HARPER’S WEEKLY, 
Nov. 15, 1913, at 10 (“[Price cutting] has been the most potent weapon of monopoly—a means of 
killing the small rival to which the great trusts have resorted most frequently.”). 
 6. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986). 
 7. See McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1501 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The Court 
recognized the debate among the Circuit Courts of Appeals and among academics concerning 
‘measure of cost’ but did not indicate what ‘measure of cost’ or ‘cost’ was appropriate.”). 
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its own distinct—but similar—approach to decide below-cost pricing 
lawsuits.8 
There are two overarching views regarding below-cost pricing in 
the United States. First, the executive branch—through the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC)—has taken a reactionary approach to 
below-cost pricing and believes the practice is not anticompetitive.9 
 
 8. See Felder’s Collision Parts, Inc. v. All Star Advert. Agency, Inc., 777 F.3d 756, 761 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (“The ‘appropriate measure’ of cost has been the subject of much scholarly and judicial 
debate. The debate is settled in our court, however, as we use average variable cost.”), cert. denied, 
577 U.S. 816 (2015); Superior Prod. P’ship v. Gordon Auto Body Parts Co., 784 F.3d 311, 319 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (“This circuit applies a burden-shifting framework to determine the ‘appropriate measure 
of a rival’s cost.’ Specifically: . . . . ‘If, however, the plaintiff proves that the defendant’s prices 
were below average variable cost, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of predatory 
pricing . . . .’” (quoting Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 938 (6th Cir. 
2005))); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he antitrust laws 
do not condemn even a monopolist for offering its product at an attractive price . . . free of charge[,] 
or even at a negative price.”); Bathke v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(adding a third element to the Brooke Group test—a plaintiff must establish the relevant geographic 
market); Multistate Legal Stud., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc., 
63 F.3d 1540, 1549 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Unfortunately for litigants, neither the Supreme Court 
nor we have taken a position on which of various cost measures is the definitive one, although we 
have spoken of marginal and average variable costs as being relevant.”), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
1044 (1996); Liggett Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 
1992), aff’g 748 F. Supp. 344, 362 n.42 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (“This court used average variable cost 
because Liggett’s evidence of predatory pricing centered on this measure; average variable cost is 
a conservative measure unlikely to penalize the competitive pricing activities of a more efficient 
competitor . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209 (1993); McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1503 (using the same test as Areeda and Turner prescribed but 
substituting short run marginal cost for average variable cost); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 
1360 (8th Cir. 1989) (“At prices above average variable cost the plaintiff must overcome a strong 
presumption of legality by showing other factors indicating that the price charged is 
anticompetitive. At prices below average variable cost, the burden of showing non-predation falls 
on the defendant.”); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 233, 236 (1st Cir. 
1983) (discussing how average variable cost is a standard but not adopting a standard because “the 
Sherman Act does not make unlawful prices that exceed both incremental and average costs”); 
Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90, 92–94 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he court must decide 
precisely what constitutes the ‘cost’ against which the price is to be measured. . . . For purposes of 
this appeal, we shall assume, without deciding, the correctness of the district court’s position that 
the average-variable-cost standard offers the preferred way to approach a claim of predatory 
pricing.”); Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981) (agreeing with 
Areeda and Turner and presuming prices below average variable cost are predatory while prices 
above marginal cost are not), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. 
v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 1981) (using average variable cost as 
an appropriate measure of cost when deciding predation), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); 
Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(accepting Areeda and Turner’s use of marginal cost or average variable cost as a factor but 
allowing for the flexibility to consider other evidence of predation). 
 9. See Note from U.S. Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affs. Competition Comm., 
Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws and Regulations 2 (Oct. 7, 2005), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-and-other-international-
competition-fora/resalepricemaintenance.pdf  
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Second, the judicial branch has attempted to decipher what the 
legislative branch intended in the Sherman Antitrust Act, Clayton Act, 
and Robinson-Patman Act (RPA).10 Although the Supreme Court 
acknowledged below-cost pricing is a problem, it has refused to clarify 
the meaning of its own words.11 Consequently, each circuit has 
developed its own unique solution to the below-cost pricing issue.12 
The FTC’s ambivalence, coupled with the absence of a consistent 
judicial standard, created the perfect storm in favor of “Big Beer.”13 
The FTC does not believe that Big Beer, by effectively pricing 
independent brewers out of the market, is attempting to monopolize 
the brewing industry.14 Supreme Court caselaw is foreboding because, 
as one Justice noted, “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and 
even more rarely successful.”15 In the end, Big Beer can rest easy 
knowing the FTC fervently believes below-cost pricing encourages 
competition—not monopolies—and there is no single, judicial 
standard to try the practice.16 
II.  THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST AND BELOW-COST PRICING 
Two of the most notorious names in antitrust history are John D. 
Rockefeller and Standard Oil. Rockefeller—and his company—
dominated the oil industry in the late 1800s through his predatory 
business practices, which included pricing competitors out of the 
market.17 Standard Oil, created by Rockefeller in 1863, controlled 90–
 
[hereinafter Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws] (“While federal antitrust law prohibits 
predatory pricing, there is no specific federal prohibition on below-cost sales.”); id. at 7 (“[Below-
cost pricing] laws are likely to have an adverse effect on consumer welfare by discouraging firms 
from competing as vigorously on price than they otherwise would and by protecting high-cost firms 
from competition from more efficient rivals.”). 
 10. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 219–30 (examining both the plain language of the statute as 
well as subsequent caselaw that interprets it); see generally McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1496–1500 
(performing a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts). 
 11. See McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1501 (acknowledging that there is a circuit split with regard to 
the measure of cost and that the Supreme Court has failed to provide clarification). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Blair Anthony Robertson, As Craft Beer Flourishes, Big Beer Continues to Buy in and 
Blur the Lines, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 2, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/food-
drink/beer/article118258943.html (defining “Big Beer” as Anheuser-Busch InBev, MillerCoors, 
Constellation Brands, and Heineken). 
 14. Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
 15. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). 
 16. McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1501; Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 7–
8. 
 17. See Antitrust 1: Standard Oil, NPR (Feb. 15, 2019, 4:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=695130695 (“In 1872, Rockefeller had about 30 rivals, 
these other refineries in Cleveland. He basically said to them, you can either join me, get in on this 
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95 percent of the oil industry by 1880.18 At the same time, public 
concern regarding the emergence of trusts like Standard Oil prompted 
legislators to begin passing state antitrust laws in 1880.19 
Antimonopoly sentiments were so pervasive that both presidential 
candidates called for anticompetition legislation during the 1888 
election.20 
Before Prohibition, large beer manufacturers dominated the 
brewing industry by using practices similar to Rockefeller’s—
integrating vertically and horizontally to control production and 
distribution.21 These behaviors prompted the federal government to 
prohibit companies from controlling individual markets by harming 
competition.22 Both the FTC and the Supreme Court observed that 
Congress enacted antitrust laws to protect consumers—not market 
participants.23 
Section A discusses the history of congressional action against 
monopolies.24 Section B explains Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner’s 
below-cost pricing framework.25 Section C presents the judiciary’s 
early approaches to below-cost pricing lawsuits under the Sherman 
Act and the RPA.26 
A.  Legislative History 
Three laws predominantly impact a corporation’s ability to 
adversely impact trade. Subsection 1 explains the Sherman Act and its 
 
amazing Standard Oil stock, or you have to compete with me. And if you don’t sell to me, I’m 
going to lower my prices more than you can. And I will crush you.”). 
 18. Standard Oil, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Standard-Oil (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 19. James May, The Story of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, in ANTITRUST STORIES 7, 11 
(Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Compare Antitrust 1: Standard Oil, supra note 17 (documenting that Rockefeller fixed 
prices, leveraged railroads against his competitors, and purchased both competitors and pipeline 
distributors), with MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 4, at 20 (“[L]arge liquor interests 
controlled, through vertical and horizontal integration, the productive and distributive channels of 
the industry.”). 
 22. See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 1 (“[F]or over 100 years, the antitrust laws have had 
the same basic objective: to protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers . . . .”). 
 23. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Taken as a whole, the 
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not 
competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend 
to lessen competition.”); The Antitrust Laws, supra note 1 (“[T]he antitrust laws have had the same 
basic objective: to protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers . . . .”). 
 24. See infra Section II.A. 
 25. See infra Section II.B. 
 26. See infra Section II.C. 
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flaws.27 Subsection 2 discusses how the Clayton Act expanded the 
Sherman Act.28 Subsection 3 describes the RPA and how it resolved a 
legislative oversight in the Clayton Act.29 
1.  The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
Congress created antitrust laws to protect consumers by 
promoting healthy competition.30 In 1890, Congress enacted the 
Sherman Act,31 which contained two major provisions. Congress 
sought to prohibit contracts and mergers created for the purpose of 
preventing competition and enhancing profits in the Sherman Act’s 
first provision.32 The second provision penalized people and 
corporations for monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, “any part 
of the trade or commerce among the several States.”33 
For seven years, purposivism prevailed as courts looked to 
Congress’s intent when applying the Sherman Act’s first provision.34 
In 1897, the Supreme Court pivoted and began interpreting the law 
using textualism.35 Then-President Theodore Roosevelt’s lament best 
illustrates the law’s flaw, which the court’s literal reading emphasized. 
Roosevelt said, “It is unfortunate that our present laws should forbid 
all combinations instead of sharply discriminating between those 
combinations which do good and those combinations which do evil.”36 
In short, a literal reading of the Sherman Act declared all interstate and 
foreign contracts illegal.37 The Supreme Court explained, “Congress 
 
 27. See infra Subsection II.A.1. 
 28. See infra Subsection II.A.2. 
 29. See infra Subsection II.A.3. 
 30. See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 1 (“[F]or over 100 years, the antitrust laws have had 
the same basic objective: to protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers . . . .”). 
 31. Sherman Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7). 
 32. Gilbert Holland Montague, The Defects of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 19 YALE L.J. 88, 
88 (1909). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 7 (2018). 
 34. Montague, supra note 32; see Purposivism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(“The doctrine that texts are to be interpreted to achieve the broad purposes that their drafters had 
in mind; specif., the idea that a judge-interpreter should seek an answer not only in the words of 
the text but also in its social, economic, and political objectives . . . .”). 
 35. Montague, supra note 32; see Textualism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(“The doctrine that the words of a governing text are of paramount concern and that what they fairly 
convey in their context is what the text means.”). 
 36. Montague, supra note 32, at 98 (quoting President Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union 
Address (Dec. 3, 1906)). 
 37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
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is the body to amend [the law], and not this court, by a process of 
judicial legislation wholly unjustifiable.”38 
Congress never amended the first provision of the Sherman Act, 
but instead relied on the second provision to protect consumers from 
monopolies.39 Despite its vagueness, the second provision is still in 
effect today.40 Although the second provision prohibits attempts to 
monopolize trade, its vague phrasing left room in the law for 
companies to argue that some predatory activities are innocuous.41 
This legislative ambiguity remained unaddressed until Congress 
enacted the Clayton Act in 1914.42 
2.  The Clayton Act of 1914 
Within twenty-five years of enacting the Sherman Act, Congress 
realized the law did not address many monopolistic practices that 
threatened trade.43 One particular practice Congress discussed is when 
a large company prices its goods below production costs to harm 
trade.44 
Congress noted that some states took it upon themselves to 
address these practices, and the federal government should 
supplement those state laws.45 
In 1914, Congress enacted the Clayton Act46 to address price 
discrimination and prevent manufacturers from harming competitors 
 
 38. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897). 
 39. See Montague, supra note 32, at 89 (“The reasons why the Act has not yet been amended 
are involved with the most important political and financial developments of the past thirteen 
years.”). 
 40. See 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 41. Id.; United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 155 (1911) (“[A]rguments made by 
both sides at bar . . . involve a conflict as to the application and effect of §§ 1 and 2 of the Anti-
trust Act . . . .”); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68–69 (1911) (“So far as the 
objections of the appellants are concerned . . . . Many arguments are pressed in various forms of 
statement which in substance amount to contending that the statute cannot be applied under the 
facts of this case without impairing rights of property and destroying the freedom of contract or 
trade . . . .”). 
 42. See infra Subsection II.A.2. 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, pt. 1, at 7–8 (1914) (explaining that the Sherman Antitrust Act is 
flawed because it only applies to interstate and foreign commerce, and the Clayton Act would 
broaden the law to apply to “all places under the jurisdiction of the United States”). 
 44. Id. at 8–9. 
 45. See id. at 9 (“The necessity for such legislation is shown by the fact that 19 States have 
enacted laws forbidding this particular form of discrimination within their borders. . . . It is 
important that these State statutes be supplemented by additional legislation by Congress . . . .”). 
 46. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53). 
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through predatory pricing.47 Under the Clayton Act, a manufacturer 
cannot lower its prices in a particular area of the country to reduce 
competition.48 Although legislators discussed powerful corporations 
“lower[ing] prices of their commodities . . . below the cost of 
production,” Congress did not address that practice in the law.49 
3.  The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 
In 1935, the FTC reported the results of its six-and-a-half-year 
study and asked Congress to amend section 2 of the Clayton Act.50 
The FTC hoped Congress would eliminate some advantages that only 
larger manufacturers could utilize, which the Clayton Act permitted.51 
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate took up bills on the 
subject, which culminated in a five-day conference committee that 
consolidated three bills into the RPA.52 
Although the RPA53 accomplished what the FTC requested, it 
also included one hotly debated change—section 3 of the act.54 Most 
notably, the act’s third section made it illegal for a person to sell goods 
“at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying 
competition.”55 This prohibition seemingly addressed Congress’s 
post-Clayton Act concerns; however, it used vague language—leaving 
 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, pt. 2, at 8 (“It is expressly designed with the view of correcting and 
forbidding a common and widespread unfair trade practice whereby certain great corporations . . . 
render unprofitable the business of competitors by selling their goods, wares, and merchandise at a 
less price in the particular communities where their rivals are engaged in business than at other 
places throughout the country.”). 
 48. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, 
in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between 
different purchasers . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent 
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 
discrimination . . . .”). 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, pt. 2, at 8. 
 50. See Newell W. Ellison, Robinson-Patman Act: Its Political and Commercial Background, 
Its Legislative History, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON ROBINSON-PATMAN ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION ACT 5 (1936) (noting that the Senate had commissioned the FTC to conduct the 
survey in 1928, and the FTC had already requested the amendment). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 6–11 (consolidating the Patman Bill, Robinson Bill, and the Borah-Van Nuys 
Bill into the RPA). 
 53. Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 13). 
 54. See Thurlow M. Gordon, Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act—The Meaning of 
Sections 1 and 3, 22 A.B.A. J. 593, 600 (1936) (labeling section three an “exceedingly dangerous 
prohibition” and including common questions about the clause, such as “What Are Unreasonably 
Low Prices?”). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2018). 
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the law open to the judiciary’s interpretation.56 Like the legislature that 
passed the Clayton Act, the 1936 Congress discussed below-cost 
pricing in its deliberations but failed to explicitly prohibit below-cost 
pricing in the RPA.57 
B.  The Areeda-Turner Framework (1975) 
The discussion of below-cost pricing and antitrust continued in 
1975 when Professors Areeda and Turner published what would 
become the baseline analytical framework for modern predatory 
pricing lawsuits.58 Areeda and Turner sought to address the “vague 
formulations” enacted by the 1914 and 1936 Congresses.59 The 
 
 56. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230–31 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(“[Barry] argues that Pacific’s discounted prices were unreasonably low. This argument founders, 
however, on the district court finding that these prices, while lower than normal, nonetheless 
generated revenues more than sufficient to cover the total cost of producing the goods to which 
they applied. Barry does not attack that finding; but, instead, it argues that price cutting by a 
monopolist may still prove unlawful, even if prices remain above total cost. While some circuits 
have accepted a form of Barry’s argument, we do not.”); 80 CONG. REC. 8,228 (1936) (“Not only 
is that very indefinite as to what is an unreasonably low price but, in addition to that, it will also 
have to be shown that it was sold at an unreasonably low price for the purpose of destroying a 
competitor.”). 
 57. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, pt. 2, at 8 (1914) (discussing how large companies “lower 
prices of their commodities, oftentimes below the cost of production in certain communities and 
sections where they had competition, with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business 
of their competitors”), and 80 CONG. REC. 8,235 (“One of the objects of the bill is to get around 
that phrase and prevent the large corporate chains from selling below cost in certain localities, thus 
destroying the independent merchants, and making it up at other places where their competitors 
have already been destroyed.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 13a (“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce, in the course of such commerce . . . to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably 
low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.”). 
 58. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 459 (2009) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221–40 (1993); 
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589–91 (1986); Felder’s Collision Parts, Inc. v. All Star 
Advert. Agency, Inc., 777 F.3d 756, 761–63 (5th Cir. 2015); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre 
Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400–04 (7th Cir. 1989); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1363 (8th 
Cir. 1989); McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1493–96 (11th Cir. 1988); Barry 
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230–40 (1st Cir. 1983); Sunshine Books, Ltd. 
v. Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90, 92–96 (3d Cir. 1982); O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 
348–53 (3d Cir. 1981); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1976); Fisherman’s 
Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 639 (Ct. App. 2003); Cel-Tech 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 554–55 (Cal. 1999). See generally Phillip 
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975) (proposing an analytical framework for below-cost 
pricing in their 1975 law review article). 
 59. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 698 (“Indeed, the classically-feared case of 
predation has been the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out 
of the market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of 
competition.”). 
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professors proposed two elements that must be present to support a 
finding of predation: financial superiority and recoupment.60 Finally, 
the professors noted that precedent created an impracticable standard, 
and their article would “formulate meaningful and workable tests” to 
distinguish between “predatory and competitive pricing.”61 
Areeda and Turner delved deeper into pricing than Congress had 
in its Clayton Act and RPA discussions by integrating economic 
principles with law to delineate between competition and predation. 
First, the pair examined the legality of a business that prices a product 
at or above average cost.62 In this instance, Areeda and Turner 
concluded that this behavior is non-predatory because price exceeds 
cost.63 
Next, Areeda and Turner broke pricing below average cost into 
two categories: pricing below average cost but above marginal cost 
and pricing below marginal cost.64 The professors explained marginal 
cost is the ideal standard to use when evaluating below-cost pricing 
claims, but it is difficult to calculate.65 Therefore, Areeda and Turner 
concluded that average variable cost (AVC) is a viable alternative to 
marginal cost.66 Subsection 1 summarizes Areeda and Turner’s view 
regarding a manufacturer that prices its goods between average total 
cost (ATC) and AVC.67 Subsection 2 describes Areeda and Turner’s 
explanation of below-AVC pricing.68 
1.  Marginal-Cost Pricing: Below ATC but Above AVC 
Under the Areeda-Turner framework, there are instances where a 
manufacturer prices its goods below ATC but above AVC—a practice 
known as “marginal-cost pricing.”69 By pricing goods in this range, a 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 699. 
 62. Id. at 700–01 (defining average cost as the sum of fixed costs, variable costs, and returns 
on investment—where fixed costs continue without output and variable costs vary with output and 
include labor, materials, utilities, licensure, etc.). 
 63. See id. at 705–09 (concluding that pricing above average cost is non-predatory when it is 
a temporary or permanent price reduction or when used as a barrier of entry into the market). 
 64. Id. at 700 (“Marginal cost is the increment to total cost that results from producing an 
additional increment of output.”). 
 65. See id. at 716 (“The primary administrative impediment to enforcing that prohibition is 
the difficulty of ascertaining a firm’s marginal cost. The incremental cost of making and selling the 
last unit cannot readily be inferred from conventional business accounts . . . .”). 
 66. Id. at 718. 
 67. See infra Subsection II.B.1. 
 68. See infra Subsection II.B.2. 
 69. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 710. 
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manufacturer with financial superiority might accomplish two 
monopolistic objectives leading to recoupment—destroy and 
discourage competition.70 Areeda and Turner also reasoned that a 
fixed price floor above AVC would permit the survival of less-
efficient manufacturers and discourage more efficient manufacturers 
from joining the market.71 Ultimately, the professors concluded that 
marginal-cost pricing is “the competitive and socially optimal result” 
because it leads to “proper resource allocation and is consistent with 
competition on the merits.”72 
2.  Below-AVC Pricing 
After discussing pricing over ATC and pricing between ATC and 
AVC, Areeda and Turner turned their attention to the final scenario—
a manufacturer that prices goods below AVC.73 Under this pricing 
model, a manufacturer prices its goods below the cost to manufacture 
and sells “at an out-of-pocket loss.”74 According to the professors, 
below-AVC pricing carries an increased likelihood that a 
manufacturer’s competition will cease to exist for reasons unrelated to 
efficiency.75 Areeda and Turner concluded courts should presume a 
manufacturer that priced below AVC “engaged in a predatory or 
exclusionary practice.”76 
Areeda and Turner explained substantive issues under the 
Sherman Act and the RPA are identical in primary-line cases so long 
as a manufacturer prices above AVC.77 They established that AVC is 
the hard line between competition and predation. Under their 
framework, courts should make two presumptions based on AVC.78 
First, a manufacturer that prices its goods above AVC has done so 
lawfully.79 Second, a manufacturer that prices its products below AVC 
is doing so unlawfully.80 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 711. 
 72. See id. at 711–12. 
 73. Id. at 712. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 726–27 (defining primary-line injury as “injury to competition between the 
discriminating seller and [its] competitors”). 
 78. Id. at 733. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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C.  Adopting the Areeda-Turner Framework 
In the years following Areeda and Turner’s article, the judiciary 
incorporated the professors’ views into common law.81 In 1986, the 
Supreme Court adopted Areeda and Turner’s predatory pricing 
analytical framework.82 Later that year, the Court reiterated its 
acceptance of Areeda and Turner’s framework in Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc.83 Finally, in 1993, the Supreme Court used 
the Areeda-Turner framework extensively when it created its uniform 
approach to discriminatory pricing in Brooke Group v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp.84 Despite repeatedly using the Areeda-
Turner framework, the Supreme Court continually declined to adopt 
the AVC standard “because it was unnecessary to do so to decide the 
cases at bar.”85 
III.  THE HISTORY OF THE BREWING INDUSTRY 
After repealing Prohibition, the federal government 
commissioned a survey of state alcohol regulations.86 This survey 
classified state alcohol legislation into three categories: licensing, 
monopoly, and prohibition.87 In addition to these categories, the study 
observed a common ground among all three regulatory schemes—the 
purpose of beer regulations was to prevent monopolistic behaviors that 
were pervasive before Prohibition.88 On December 5, 1933, the United 
States brewing industry started anew with the goal to create an 
industry free of monopolies.89 
The brewing industry’s landscape and the price of beer 
experienced great change after Prohibition ended.90 Section A 
discusses the changes in the brewing industry from Prohibition to 
 
 81. James R. McCall, Private Enforcement of Predatory Price Laws Under the California 
Unlawful Practices Act and the Federal Antitrust Acts, 28 PAC. L.J. 311, 319 (1997). 
 82. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–91 (1986). 
 83. 479 U.S. 104, 117 n.12 (1986) (adapting Areeda and Turner’s explanation of predatory 
pricing and acknowledging the debate on an appropriate measure of cost). 
 84. 509 U.S. 209, 219–30 (1993) (citing Areeda and Turner five times and discussing many 
of the same principles that they discussed in their article). 
 85. McCall, supra note 81, at 319; see id. at 319 n.59. 
 86. See MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 4, at 21 (indicating that the primary purpose 
of the survey was to analyze all state laws directly affecting marketing goods and reporting on the 
liquor industry in particular). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 20. 
 89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (permitting the manufacture and sale of alcohol in the United 
States). 
 90. See infra Part III. 
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today.91 Section B analyzes how the development of the craft brewing 
industry created healthy competition and benefitted consumers by 
decreasing the price of beer.92 Section C presents evidence of Big 
Beer’s legislative efforts to reestablish its former market share.93 Last, 
Section D highlights Big Beer’s antitrust activities that are increasing 
its current market share back to pre-craft brewing levels.94 
A.  Industry Change in the Post-Prohibition Era 
The craft brewing industry did not exist at the end of Prohibition. 
In fact, the number of breweries did not experience significant growth 
until after 1990.95 After Prohibition ended, longstanding beer 
manufacturers like Anheuser-Busch resumed production, and the 
number of brewers in the United States reached nearly one thousand.96 
This number was nowhere near pre-Prohibition levels, but it was the 
most breweries in the country between 1941–1995.97 By 1961, the 
number of breweries had dwindled and there were only 230 in 
operation—only 140 of which were independent breweries.98 In 1983, 
the United States saw the lowest number of breweries operating in the 
twentieth century at eighty.99 Fifty-one parent companies owned those 
eighty breweries and the six largest companies—Anheuser-Busch, 
Miller, Heileman, Stroh, Coors, and Pabst—produced 92 percent of 
all beer in the United States.100 
Something changed in the late 1980s—the craft brewing industry 
was in its infancy. The number of breweries exploded between 1985–
1998—it jumped to one thousand in 1996 and fifteen hundred in 
1998.101 Since 1985, the number of craft breweries in the United States 
has continued to climb and only contracted during the Great 
Recession.102 Year 2005 was the last year that the number of breweries 
 
 91. See infra Section III.A. 
 92. See infra Section III.B. 
 93. See infra Section III.C. 
 94. See infra Section III.D. 
 95. Mapping the American Brewing Renaissance, VINEPAIR, https://vinepair.com/map-
american-craft-brewing-history/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 96. Id.; History of American Beer, BEER ADVOC., https://www.beeradvocate.com/beer/ 
101/history_american_beer/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 97. Mapping the American Brewing Renaissance, supra note 95. 
 98. History of American Beer, supra note 96. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Mapping the American Brewing Renaissance, supra note 95. 
 102. Id. 
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declined—by 2016, the number of breweries in the United States 
surpassed five thousand.103 
The brewing industry vastly changed between 1983–2016, as the 
number of brewers increased by 6,250 percent.104 During the same 
period, Big Beer’s market share dropped from producing 92 percent 
of all beer in 1983 to 72 percent in 2018.105 Craft brewers’ market 
share increased from 8 percent to 28 percent over the same period.106 
Today, Big Beer still earns more than half of the industry’s retail sales, 
but it no longer dominates the market like it once did.107 
B.  The Retail Price of Beer in the Post-Prohibition Era 
After Congress ended Prohibition, the number of brewers 
fluctuated until its population exploded in the late 1980s.108 Through 
the industry’s early expansions and contractions, the price of beer—
adjusted for inflation—remained relatively constant.109 From 1950–
1980, the price of beer averaged around $5.50 per pint.110 After 1980, 
the price of a pint demonstrated what economists have long 
postulated—price is negatively correlated to competition.111 A pint 
dropped to $4.07 by 1990—the year the number of brewers peaked 
before the Great Recession.112 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Compare History of American Beer, supra note 96 (observing that Big Beer controlled 92 
percent of production in 1983), with DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO TAX AND 
TRADE BUREAU, NUMBER OF BREWERS BY PRODUCTION SIZE—CY 2018 (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://www.ttb.gov/images/pdfs/statistics/production_size/2018_brew_prod_size_ttb_gov.pdf 
[hereinafter NUMBER OF BREWERS REPORT] (reporting that large breweries—or breweries that 
produced over six million barrels a year—produced 72 percent of all U.S. beer in 2018). 
 106. Compare History of American Beer, supra note 96 (noting that Big Beer produced 92 
percent of all U.S. beer in 1983), with NUMBER OF BREWERS REPORT, supra note 105 (explaining 
that small breweries—or breweries that produced less than six million barrels a year—produced 28 
percent of all U.S. beer in 2018). 
 107. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 4, at 20, 22, 25; Thomas A. Gerhart, Comment, 
Undermining the Law: How Uninformed Legislating Helps Big Beer Erode California’s Tied-
House Laws, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 25, 28 (2019). 
 108. Mapping the American Brewing Renaissance, supra note 95. 
 109. Jay Brooks, The Price of a Beer: 1952–2016, BROOKSTON BEER BULL. (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://brookstonbeerbulletin.com/the-price-of-a-beer-1952-2016/. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 162, 165 
(2013) (“Competition can yield . . . lower costs and prices for goods and services [and] better 
quality . . . .”). 
 112. Compare Mapping the American Brewing Renaissance, supra note 95 (observing that the 
number of brewers increased between 1980–2017), with Brooks, supra note 109 (documenting that 
the price of a pint dropped from $4.63 in 1980 to $3.99 in 2016). 
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In 1978, President Jimmy Carter amended the Internal Revenue 
Code to legalize homebrewing.113 A pint cost consumers more than 
five dollars just three years before homebrewing was legal, and the 
price of a pint has not exceeded that mark since.114 Following the 
United States legalization of homebrewing, the price of a pint began 
to decrease at an accelerated rate. Between 1956–1976, the price fell 
from approximately six dollars to five dollars and from five dollars to 
nearly four dollars by 1985.115 In 2013, the price per pint dipped below 
roughly four dollars and has stayed there ever since.116 
C.  Big Beer’s Legislative Efforts to Regain Control of the Market 
Facing a decreasing market share and a smaller profit line, Big 
Beer began to look at other ways to regain its market dominance. The 
Twenty-First Amendment left regulating alcohol to the individual 
states, so Big Beer began lobbying state legislatures to gain 
advantages over its competitors.117 Regaining a foothold in California 
is critical for Big Beer because the state consumed the most beer by 
any state in 2017.118 Additionally, competition for that market is stiff 
because California had more breweries than any other state in 2017—
more than double the state with the second most breweries.119 
California uses a licensing system to regulate its brewing 
industry.120 Under California’s regulatory system, licensees cannot 
perform a particular act unless a statute explicitly permits it.121 As Big 
Beer’s market share decreased, and the price of a pint followed suit, 
the number of legislative exceptions in the state began to increase.122 
The post-Prohibition era saw very few changes to California’s beer 
 
 113. See Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-458, § 2(b)(1)(e), 92 Stat. 1255 (codified as amended at 
26 U.S.C. § 5042) (“[A]ny adult may, without payment of tax, produce beer for personal or family 
use and not for sale.”). 
 114. History of American Beer, supra note 96; Brooks, supra note 109. 
 115. Brooks, supra note 109. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in 
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”); Gerhart, supra note 107, at 33 (discussing 
various exceptions that Big Beer lobbied for in California after 1960). 
 118. Mapped & Ranked: The States with the Most Craft Breweries in 2017, VINEPAIR, 
https://vinepair.com/articles/map-states-most-craft-breweries-2018/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 119. Id. 
 120. MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, supra note 4, at 20, 22. 
 121. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23300 (Deering 2020) (“No person shall exercise the 
privilege or perform any act which a licensee may exercise or perform under the authority of a 
license unless the person is authorized to do so by a license issued pursuant to this division.”). 
 122. Gerhart, supra note 107, at 45. 
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laws—the state enacted two exceptions to its beer laws between 1960–
1980.123 The first exception allowed manufacturers to assist retailers 
in Crescent City after a natural disaster, and the second allowed 
retailers to hold diminutive amounts of stock in manufacturers.124 
From 1980–2000, California’s Legislature enacted eight new 
exceptions to its beer laws—some of which, but not all, created 
benefits for larger manufacturers.125 These new exceptions permitted 
manufacturers to provide inducements to retailers in the form of 
sponsorships, replacement equipment after a natural disaster, and 
tickets to sporting events.126 These pay-to-play activities are the 
precise thing that California’s original beer laws prohibited, yet Big 
Beer lobbied and changed the law to gain market advantages that 
smaller brewers cannot afford.127 
Finally, the uptick in legislative exceptions continued between 
2000–2018, when the Legislature enacted eight new exceptions.128 It 
passed AB 2573 in 2018, but Governor Brown vetoed the bill because 
of its pay-to-play nature.129 A nearly identical bill emerged in the 
2019–2020 legislative session, presumably because a new governor 
might sign it into law.130 
D.  Big Beer’s Other Strategies for Market Dominance 
Big Beer’s attempts to recapture its place at the top of the market 
transcend lobbying. It has continually evolved the way that it does 
business to find other methods to control the industry. Unlike its 
 
 123. Id. at 45 n.182. 
 124. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.12; see also Act of May 18, 1964, ch. 86, § 1, 1964 
Cal. Stat. 275, 275 (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511).  
 125. Gerhart, supra note 107, at 45 n.182. 
 126. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25503.23, 25503.27, 25511. 
 127. See id. § 25500(a)(2) (prohibiting manufacturers from giving any “thing of value” to 
licensed alcohol seller). 
 128. Gerhart, supra note 107, at 45 n.182. 
 129. See Letter from Jerry Brown, Governor, Cal., to Cal. State Assembly (Sept. 6, 2018) 
(“[T]his law creates an economic disadvantage for small beer manufactures who might not be able 
to provide free glassware in the same manner as the larger manufacturers.”). 
 130. Compare Assemb. B. 2573, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (permitting beer 
manufacturers to give a retailer five free cases of glassware per year but restricting a retailer to 
accepting no more than ten cases total per year), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25600.05 
(allowing a beer manufacturer to give five cases of glassware to a retailer for free per year but 
limiting the amount of glassware a retailer can accept to ten cases). See also Assemb. B. 1133, 
2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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legislative foray, these other methods seek to stifle competition by 
either purchasing or harming competitors.131 
Over the last five years, the brewing industry has seen many 
attempts by Big Beer to reconquer the market. These new methods 
include cutting off access to ingredients, dominating production, 
purchasing competition, and controlling distribution channels.132 In 
2017, Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI) purchased the entire South 
African hops harvest to prevent craft brewers from accessing coveted 
hop varietals.133 Then, ABI purchased SAB Miller in 2018 and now 
produces approximately 50 percent of all beer in the United States.134 
Big Beer has also purchased a slew of craft breweries and continues 
to market those brands as “craft beer.”135 Additionally, the United 
States Justice Department investigated ABI for purchasing 
distribution chains in an attempt to restrict market access for craft 
brewers.136 
America’s brewing industry has undergone many changes since 
Prohibition ended, and analyzing these changes reveals trends that 
help explain the industry today. First, the increased number of brewers 
resulted in increased competition after 1983, which drove down the 
price of beer.137 Second, the massive increase in the number of brewers 
cut into Big Beer’s market share.138 Last, since the late 1970s, Big 
Beer has attempted to regain control over the brewing industry through 
both legislative and other means.139 
 
 131. Big Alcohol Buys Out Craft on Its Way to Monopoly, ALCOHOL JUST., 
https://alcoholjustice.org/watchdogging-2/in-the-doghouse/1306-big-alcohol-buys-out-craft-on-
its-way-to-monopoly/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021); Jason Notte, Opinion: Anheuser-Busch InBev 
Shuts Out Craft Beer Brewers by Hoarding Hops, MARKETWATCH (May 12, 2017, 3:09 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/anheuser-busch-inbev-shuts-out-craft-beer-brewers-by-
hoarding-hops-2017-05-11. 
 132. See infra notes 133–136. 
 133. Notte, supra note 131. 
 134. Keith Gribbins, AB InBev Purchase of SABMiller Is Finally Approved; Here Are the 
Important Modifications, CRAFT BREWING BUS. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.craftbrewingbusine
ss.com/business-marketing/ab-inbev-purchase-of-sabmiller-is-finally-approved-here-are-the-
important-modifications/. 
 135. Big Alcohol Buys Out Craft on Its Way to Monopoly, supra note 131; Alastair Bland, 
Craft Beer, Brought to You by Big Beer, NPR (July 28, 2017, 12:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/sec
tions/thesalt/2017/07/28/539760477/craft-beer-brought-to-you-by-big-beer. 
 136. Diane Bartz, Exclusive: U.S. Queries AB InBev on Distribution Incentives amid Merger 
Probe, REUTERS (May 24, 2016, 10:07 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-a-b-i-craftbeers-
probe-exclusive-idUSKCN0YG0EG. 
 137. See supra Sections III.A–B. 
 138. See supra Section III.A. 
 139. See supra Sections III.C–D. 
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IV.  THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND BELOW-COST PRICING 
Congress created antitrust laws to prevent monopolists from 
harming consumers by charging supracompetitive prices.140 
Technically, the FTC does not enforce the Sherman Act; however, it 
can bring actions under the FTC Act that resemble Sherman Act, 
Clayton Act, and RPA violations.141 Although one the FTC’s duties is 
to monitor price discrimination, it has taken the stance that pricing 
goods below cost “does not necessarily injure competition.”142 Rather, 
the commission noted the practice “may simply reflect particularly 
vigorous competition.”143 
The FTC has moved beyond the role of regulator and enforcer, 
raising doubt over whether it guards the market from below-cost 
pricing. In a 2005 report, the FTC categorized below-cost pricing as 
mere competition and explained that it openly—and sometimes 
successfully—discourages states from regulating the practice.144 
Labelling below-cost pricing as a “hallmark of competition” 
undermines the validity of statements regarding the frequency of 
below-cost pricing lawsuits.145 
One way for a manufacturer to develop a monopoly is to destroy 
competition through unreasonably low prices—the two practices 
explicitly prohibited by the Sherman Act and the RPA.146 As Areeda 
and Turner noted, two necessary elements to create a monopoly by 
predatory pricing are financial superiority and recoupment.147 
Relationships between the Sherman Act, RPA, and monopoly creation 
build a foundation to challenge the credibility of the FTC’s position 
regarding below-cost pricing—that it is mere competition.148 The 
 
 140. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 1. 
 141. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018); The Antitrust Laws, supra note 1 (“The Federal Trade 
Commission Act bans ‘unfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices.’”). 
 142. Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/predatory-or-below-cost 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2021). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 2 (“[T]he FTC’s competition 
advocacy program has tried—successfully in some cases—to persuade state legislators not to enact 
these laws.”). 
 145. Compare id. at 5 (explaining that lowering prices, in the context of below-cost pricing, is 
the “hallmark of competition”), with Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, supra note 142 (“Instances 
of a large firm using low prices to drive smaller competitors out of the market in hopes of raising 
prices after they leave are rare.”). 
 146. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 13a. 
 147. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 698. 
 148. Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9. 
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FTC’s position on below-cost pricing, coupled with its campaigns 
against state predatory pricing legislation, undermine whether the 
practice is as rare or innocuous as the agency purports. 
V.  THE JUDICIARY’S APPROACH TO BELOW-COST PRICING 
Areeda and Turner’s discussion of price and antitrust provided a 
baseline that has appeared in most modern below-cost pricing cases.149 
Despite their guidance, courts have struggled between using ATC, 
marginal cost, AVC, or something else when discerning whether a 
price was predatory.150 Section A examines the Brooke Group test, 
which the Supreme Court created to assess predatory pricing claims 
under the RPA.151 Section B investigates the various circuit splits that 
have emerged since Areeda and Turner published their article in 
1975.152 Section C discusses additional requirements for bringing a 
successful below-cost pricing claim.153 Section D presents the final 
element of a primary-line predatory pricing claim under the RPA.154 
Section E explains the elements of a Sherman Act claim.155 
A.  The Brooke Group Test 
After decades of cobbling together a quasi-workable approach to 
resolve predatory pricing claims, the Supreme Court created the 
modern standard in 1993.156 In Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson 
 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
 150. See McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1503 (11th Cir. 1988) (opting to use 
short run marginal cost instead of AVC); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 
234 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s use of AVC); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. 
v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 1981) (“If the defendant’s prices were 
below [ATC] but [AVC], the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the defendant’s pricing was 
predatory.”). 
 151. See infra Section V.A. 
 152. See infra Section V.B. 
 153. See infra Section V.C. 
 154. See infra Section V.D. 
 155. See infra Section V.E. 
 156. Compare Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 548 (1960) 
(indicating that federal courts consistently emphasize a defendant’s unreasonably low prices and 
predatory intent), A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1405–06 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (discussing how Utah Pie applied the same standard expressed in FTC v. Anheuser 
Busch, Inc. when it held the Sherman Act permits some discrimination prohibited by the RPA), 
Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321, 329 (8th Cir. 1965) (analyzing the meaning 
of “below cost” to resolve the lawsuit), vacated, 384 U.S. 883 (1966), and Porto Rican Am. 
Tobacco Co. of P.R. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 1929) (using “ruinous 
competition” as the basis for evaluating below-cost pricing), with Brooke Grp. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993) (creating a concrete, two-part test that 
normalized the approach to Sherman Act and RPA claims). 
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Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court created a two-step prerequisite test 
for below-cost pricing claims under the Sherman Act and the RPA.157 
The Court combined earlier caselaw with the Areeda-Turner 
framework to create a baseline test for analyzing below-cost pricing 
claims.158 Additionally, it normalized the predatory pricing analysis 
under the two laws when it wrote, “[the Sherman Act and the RPA’s] 
two prerequisites to recovery remain the same.”159 
The first element places the burden on the plaintiff to “prove that 
the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its 
rival’s costs.”160 The Supreme Court cited some of the most famous—
and infamous—predatory pricing cases when it created this first 
prong.161 To justify this element, the Court reasoned that low prices 
benefit consumers and do not threaten competition if they are above 
predatory levels.162 Further, the Court reinforced its position when it 
explained, “below-cost prices may constitute ‘unreasonably low’ 
prices for purposes of [RPA].”163 
Under the second element, a court should examine whether the 
defendant had a reasonable prospect—or a dangerous probability—of 
recouping its losses because of below-cost pricing.164 Again, the 
Supreme Court looked to precedent when it crafted this element.165 It 
distinguished a below-cost pricing scheme without recoupment from 
one where the “predator profits from predation.”166 To differentiate 
recoupment from price reduction, the Court explained “without 
[recoupment], predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices in 
the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced.”167 
 
 157. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–24. 
 158. See generally id. (citing below-cost pricing cases from the 1920s–1990s, Areeda and 
Turner’s law review article, and canons of construction to craft its two-part test). 
 159. See id. at 222 (explaining the test is the same regardless of whether it is a Sherman Act or 
RPA claim). 
 160. Id. at 222. 
 161. See id. at 222–23 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986); then 
citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986); and then citing 
Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 698 (1967)). 
 162. Id. at 223. 
 163. See id. (citing United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 37 (1963)). 
 164. Id. at 224. 
 165. See id. (citing Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 117; and then citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 
475 U.S. at 585). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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B.  Interpreting an Appropriate Measure of Cost: Circuit Splits 
Contrary to the FTC’s belief that below-cost pricing is a 
competitive practice, almost every circuit uses some derivative of 
AVC as its measure of cost.168 A clear minority—comprised of the 
D.C., First, and Tenth Circuits—emerged and has not adopted a 
measure of cost.169 The remaining nine circuits use some form of AVC 
as a measure of cost.170 These circuits split into two camps: AVC 
hardliners and burden-shifting jurisdictions.171 Subsection 1 discusses 
the minority’s avoidance approach to measure of cost.172 Subsection 2 
explains the AVC hardline approach.173 Subsection 3 describes the 
AVC burden-shifting method.174 
1.  Minority Jurisdictions 
In their 1975 publication, Areeda and Turner conceptualized a 
standard measure of cost for below-cost pricing claims.175 Next, the 
Supreme Court adopted the phrase “an appropriate measure of cost” 
and integrated that phrase into the Brooke Group test.176 Since creating 
a standard dependent on an appropriate measure of cost, the Supreme 
Court has denied certiorari in multiple cases where it could have 
clarified what the phrase means.177 
After the Supreme Court created the ambiguous cost standard, 
three circuits adopted the same approach by refusing to select a 
 
 168. See supra note 9. 
 169. See infra Subsection V.B.1. 
 170. See supra note 8. 
 171. See infra Subsections V.B.2–3. 
 172. See infra Subsection V.B.1. 
 173. See infra Subsection V.B.2. 
 174. See infra Subsection V.B.3. 
 175. See generally Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 697 (proposing average variable cost as 
the basis for which courts should weigh predatory pricing claims). 
 176. Compare S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (using the phrase “an appropriate measure of cost” for the first time in the context of 
predatory pricing), Am. Trucking Ass’n v. United States, 755 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(becoming the second court to discuss appropriate measures of cost), and Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort 
of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (“Predatory pricing may be defined as pricing below an 
appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing 
competition in the long run.”), with Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209, 222 (1993) (incorporating the phrase “an appropriate measure of cost” into the first prong of 
the Brooke Group test). 
 177. Felder’s Collision Parts, Inc. v. All Star Advert. Agency, Inc., 777 F.3d 756, 761 (5th Cir. 
2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 816 (2015); Multistate Legal Stud., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1549 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1044 
(1996); McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1503 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 
U.S. 1084 (1989). 
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measure of cost and avoiding the question altogether.178 Five years 
after Brooke Group, the D.C. Circuit explained that the Supreme Court 
left the measure of cost question “unresolved.”179 In 2001, the D.C. 
Circuit implicitly rejected the Areeda and Turner framework in United 
States v. Microsoft Corp.180 It explained that antitrust laws do not 
prohibit a monopolist from “offering its product . . . free of charge or 
even at a negative price.”181 
In 1983, the First Circuit refused to adopt a measure of cost and 
has since resolved six post-Brooke Group below-cost pricing cases on 
other grounds.182 The Tenth Circuit explicitly sided with the Supreme 
Court when it wrote, “neither the Supreme Court nor we have taken a 
position on which of various cost measures is the definitive one.”183 
After aligning itself with the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit has 
side-stepped the measure of cost question in five post-Brooke Group 
below-cost pricing cases.184 
2.  Hardline Jurisdictions 
Areeda and Turner grouped pricing into three categories: above-
ATC pricing, marginal-cost pricing (between ATC and AVC), and 
below-AVC pricing.185 The professors explained that marginal-cost 
pricing appears to be predatory, but it actually encourages and rewards 
market efficiency.186 Ultimately, the pair concluded that AVC is the 
 
 178. Compare Multistate Legal Stud., Inc., 63 F.3d at 1549 (adopting the Supreme Court’s 
approach of not selecting a measure of cost), and Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 
F.2d 227, 233, 236 (1st Cir. 1983) (avoiding the question on measure of cost because the case 
involved pricing above total cost), with McCall, supra note 81 (explaining how the Supreme Court 
was able to avoid defining an appropriate measure of cost). 
 179. La. Energy & Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 141 F.3d 364, 366 n.3 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). 
 180. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 181. Id. at 68. 
 182. Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Loc. Union No. 7, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, 815 F.3d 43, 71 (1st 
Cir. 2016); Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestlé, S.A., 656 F.3d 112, 126 (1st Cir. 2011); Able Sales Co. 
v. Compañía de Azúcar de Puerto Rico, 406 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2005); Bridges v. MacLean-
Stevens Studios, Inc., 201 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2000); C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 137 
F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1998); R.W. Int’l Corp. v. Welch Food, Inc., 13 F.3d 478, 488 (1st Cir. 1994); 
Barry Wright Corp., 724 F.2d at 233, 236. 
 183. Multistate Legal Stud., Inc., 63 F.3d at 1549 n.5. 
 184. Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1299 (10th Cir. 
2008); Par. Oil Co. v. Dillon Cos., 523 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir. 2008); Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. 
Sam’s E., Inc., 362 F.3d 639, 653 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 
1120–21 (10th Cir. 2003); Multistate Legal Stud., Inc., 63 F.3d at 1549 n.5. 
 185. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 704–15. 
 186. Id. at 711. 
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hardline between competition and predation—above-AVC prices are 
legal and below-AVC prices are illegal.187 
In 1981, the Second Circuit adopted the AVC hardline 
approach188 and has since presumed predation for below-AVC 
prices.189 After Areeda and Turner published their article, the Third 
Circuit encountered two below-cost pricing cases.190 It applied AVC 
in both instances191 but refused to decide “the correctness of the 
district court’s position that the [AVC] standard offers the preferred 
way to approach a claim of predatory pricing.”192 The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s adoption of the AVC hardline in 1992, and 
the Supreme Court created the Brooke Group test to affirm that 
decision the following year.193 
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the scholarly and judicial 
debates regarding a measure of cost when it accepted Areeda and 
Turner’s AVC hardline.194 This circuit moved beyond mere 
acceptance and discussed the varying opinions regarding which costs 
are variable.195 The Seventh Circuit also accepted the AVC hardline, 
but it emphasized the importance of other evidence in below-cost 
pricing lawsuits.196 Last, the Eleventh Circuit prefers short-run 
marginal cost over AVC, but it acknowledged that AVC is a viable 
substitute in predation cases.197 This circuit also explicitly 
distinguished its approach from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits because 
it rejected their burden-shifting approach to predation.198 
 
 187. Id. at 711–12. 
 188. Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 189. See, e.g., Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 407 
(2d Cir. 1988). 
 190. Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891, 902–03 (3d Cir. 1985); 
Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90, 93–94 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 191. Indian Coffee Corp., 752 F.2d at 902–03; Sunshine Books, Ltd., 697 F.2d at 93–94. 
 192. Sunshine Books, Ltd., 697 F.2d at 93–94. 
 193. Liggett Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 1992), 
aff’g 748 F. Supp. 344, 362 n.42 (M.D.N.C. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Brooke Grp. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24, 243 (1993). 
 194. Felder’s Collision Parts, Inc. v. All Star Advert. Agency, Inc., 777 F.3d 756, 761 (5th Cir. 
2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 816 (2015). 
 195. Id. at 761–62. 
 196. Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
 197. McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1503–04 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
490 U.S. 1084 (1989). 
 198. Id. at 1503 n.37. 
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3.  Burden-Shifting Jurisdictions 
Three circuits adopted a burden-shifting framework, where the 
courts use Areeda and Turner’s AVC hardline as the determining 
factor for who has the burden of proof.199 If a defendant prices its 
goods below AVC, then the burden falls on the defendant to 
demonstrate there was no predation.200 Conversely, if a defendant 
prices its goods above AVC, then the plaintiff must overcome a strong 
presumption of legality.201 To prevail, a plaintiff must present 
evidence that the defendant priced in the marginal-cost range and 
sought to harm competition.202 
The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits use the framework 
described above to determine which party has the burden of proof in 
predation cases.203 Essentially, these circuits agree with Areeda and 
Turner’s conclusions regarding above-ATC pricing and below-AVC 
pricing but disagree on marginal-cost pricing.204 Areeda and Turner 
consider pricing between ATC and AVC the ideal price model, but 
burden-shifting jurisdictions allow a plaintiff to succeed against a 
defendant that priced in this range.205 The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits employ a strong presumption of legality for above-AVC 
pricing and the presumption of predation for below-AVC pricing.206 
 
 199. See infra notes 200–202. 
 200. Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1360 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 938 (6th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., 
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1025 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(presenting evidence that the defendant hired consultants to generate a report that would identify 
ways “to hasten wholesaler exit”). 
 203. Superior Prod. P’ship v. Gordon Auto Body Parts Co., 784 F.3d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 2015); 
Spirit Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d at 938; Morgan, 892 F.2d at 1360; William Inglis & Sons Baking Co., 
668 F.2d at 1035–36. 
 204. Compare supra Section II.B (above ATC is legal, pricing between ATC and AVC is 
optimal, and below AVC is predatory), with Superior Prod. P’ship, 784 F.3d at 319 (using AVC 
as the barometer between who has the burden of proof—plaintiff or defendant) (quoting Spirit 
Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d at 938), Morgan, 892 F.2d at 1360 (placing the burden on the plaintiff to 
prove above-AVC predation, but placing the burden on the defendant to prove non-predation in 
below-cost pricing scenarios), and William Inglis & Sons Baking Co., 668 F.2d at 1041 (“[U]nless 
the plaintiff proves that the prices were below the defendant’s average variable cost, the plaintiff 
bears the burden of establishing that the anticipated benefits of the prices depended on their 
anticipated destructive effect on competition. If the plaintiff does prove pricing below average 
variable cost, the burden shifts to the defendant . . . .”). 
 205. Superior Prod. P’ship, 784 F.3d at 319; Morgan, 892 F.2d at 1360; William Inglis & Sons 
Baking Co., 668 F.2d at 1041; see supra Section II.B. 
 206. Superior Prod. P’ship, 784 F.3d at 319; Morgan, 892 F.2d at 1360; William Inglis & Sons 
Baking Co., 668 F.2d at 1041. 
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C.  Additional Requirements Beyond the Brooke Group Test 
Although the Supreme Court created its two-pronged test in 
Brooke Group, other courts have since emphasized other parts of the 
decision to add new legal requirements. Areeda and Turner discussed 
each of these additional elements, albeit briefly, when they proposed 
their framework for analyzing cost in predatory pricing lawsuits.207 
Subsection 1 presents the relevant market requirement.208 Subsection 
2 examines how a rational economic motive is necessary for predatory 
intent.209 Subsection 3 explains how courts consider a monopolist’s 
market power to establish recoupment.210 Subsection 4 describes the 
relationship between recoupment and barriers to entry.211 
1.  The Eighth Circuit’s Relevant Market Requirement 
Areeda and Turner concluded that below-cost pricing is unlawful 
“whether between different geographic markets or in the same 
market.”212 Contrary to the professors, the Eighth Circuit places a 
great emphasis on the Brooke Group test’s use of the phrase “relevant 
market.”213 In fact, the Eighth Circuit fails many below-cost pricing 
lawsuits because it requires plaintiffs to “establish the relevant 
geographic market to recover” in a predatory pricing case.214 
According to the Eighth Circuit, a relevant market is the geographic 
area customers could practically buy alternative goods if the 
defendant’s prices were too high.215 Although the Eighth Circuit is the 
 
 207. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 698, 733. 
 208. See infra Subsection V.C.1. 
 209. See infra Subsection V.C.2. 
 210. See infra Subsection V.C.3. 
 211. See infra Subsection V.C.4. 
 212. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 733. 
 213. See Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) 
(“Evidence of below-cost pricing is not alone sufficient to permit an inference of probable 
recoupment and injury to competition. Determining whether recoupment of predatory losses is 
likely requires an estimate of the cost of the alleged predation and a close analysis of both the 
scheme alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant market.”); Bathke 
v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring that a plaintiff must 
establish the relevant geographic market before it will consider the Brooke Group test). 
 214. Bathke, 64 F.3d at 344 (affirming the district court’s holding that the plaintiff failed to 
demonstrate the relevant market); Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., 911 F.3d 
505, 517 (8th Cir. 2018); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1239–40 (8th Cir. 
2011); Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2009); Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); Morgenstern v. 
Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 215. See Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA, 591 F.3d at 596 (explaining that the relevant market 
is comprised of both the product and the geographic area). 
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only circuit that considers relevant market separately from the other 
Brooke Group elements, craft brewers should be prepared to address 
the topic.216 Until the Supreme Court clarifies the validity of this 
requirement, craft brewers must demonstrate that Big Beer sells the 
same product—in the same geographic market—below cost. 
2.  Predatory Intent and a Rational Economic Motive 
Areeda and Turner explained that “predatory pricing would make 
little economic sense to a potential predator” without financial staying 
power and a substantial prospect of recoupment.217 In Matsushita218—
a major pre-Brooke Group case—the Supreme Court laid the 
groundwork for modern below-cost pricing analysis. Specifically, 
Matsushita stressed that a plaintiff could link the defendant’s 
predatory pricing to an intent to capture the market—if doing so made 
economic sense.219 Although predatory intent was part of the 
unworkable pre-Brooke Group standard, some courts today still 
consider intent—to some degree.220 After the Supreme Court 
explicitly moved away from subjective intent in Brooke Group, many 
courts stopped hinging predation cases upon the defendant’s intent to 
monopolize the market.221 
Today, courts are willing to consider a defendant’s intent to harm 
competition as some evidence of predation—if a monopoly is 
economically reasonable.222 Fortunately for craft brewers, there is 
tangible evidence supporting how and why Big Beer has attempted to 
 
 216. Compare supra note 214 (identifying multiple below-cost pricing cases within the same 
circuit that failed due to a plaintiff’s inability to establish the relevant market), with Superior Prod. 
P’ship v. Gordon Auto Body Parts Co., 784 F.3d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 2015) (combining relevant 
market with the recoupment requirement), ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 276–77 
(3d Cir. 2012) (including relevant market as part of both Brooke Group elements), and United 
States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the relevant market 
requirement is for Sherman Act claims and is not part of the Brooke Group predatory pricing 
analysis). 
 217. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 698. 
 218. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 219. Id. at 587 (“[I]f the factual context renders respondents’ claim implausible—if the claim 
is one that simply makes no economic sense—respondents must come forward with more 
persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.”). 
 220. Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 703 (1967); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 548 (1960); see, e.g., Superior Prod. P’ship, 784 F.3d at 319 
(“[C]ourts are more likely to infer an illegal agreement as the economic plausibility of 
anticompetitive conduct grows.”). 
 221. Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993); see, e.g., 
Double H Plastics, Inc. v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 732 F.2d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that 
courts may infer predatory intent from below-cost pricing). 
 222. See supra note 219. 
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monopolize the industry.223 From a market standpoint, craft brewers 
should present evidence of the increasing number of breweries in the 
market and the decreasing price of beer over time.224 Regarding Big 
Beer’s specific actions, craft brewers should present evidence of Big 
Beer’s decreasing market share and its attempts to regain control of 
the market.225 
3.  Market Power 
Areeda and Turner discussed how recoupment requires a would-
be predator to have more “financial staying power” than its rivals and 
a strong prospect of recouping its losses.226 Recoupment occurs when 
a manufacturer destroys competition by taking short-term losses and 
holding control of the market to recoup those losses in the long term.227 
The Eleventh Circuit incorporated Areeda and Turner’s words into the 
common law, as a two-factor analysis, to help courts determine the 
likelihood of recoupment.228 
First, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had “sufficient 
market power to set supracompetitive prices.”229 If a predator is unable 
to set high prices after removing competition, then there can be no 
recoupment. The second factor depends on whether a defendant can 
sustain the elevated prices “long enough to recoup its losses.”230 The 
absence of these two factors substantially decreases a manufacturer’s 
likelihood of recouping losses. Here, a craft brewer could demonstrate 
Big Beer’s market power by showing its vertical and horizontal 
integration, dominance in market production, and control over 
distribution.231 
 
 223. See supra Part III. 
 224. See supra Sections III.A–B (discussing how the number of breweries has increased over 
6,000 percent since 1983 and that the price of beer has dropped by more than $1.50 in the last forty 
years). 
 225. See supra Sections III.C–D (citing evidence of Big Beer’s attempts to restrict market 
access, limit access to ingredients, and pass pay-to-play legislation after the emergence of the craft 
beer industry). 
 226. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 698. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1245 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See supra Part III. 
(7) 54.3_CROXALL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/21 2:40 PM 
762 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:733 
4.  Barrier to Entry into the Market 
A barrier to entry is an economic condition “that makes it difficult 
for a business to enter a market and compete with existing 
businesses.”232 Barriers to entry result in higher costs for new 
businesses than for existing businesses.233 Areeda and Turner 
explained that a barrier to entry is helpful for a predator seeking to 
regain the losses it incurred by selling below cost.234 The Ninth Circuit 
analyzed barriers to entry in a predatory pricing context and concluded 
market power is essential for establishing that a barrier exists.235 
It may seem difficult to prove a barrier exists in the brewing 
industry because of the post-1983 expansion, but courts believe 
barriers are a byproduct of market power.236 Big Beer has significant 
market power because it produces over 70 percent of all beer in the 
United States.237 Additionally, Big Beer has been trying to regain lost 
market power through vertical and horizontal integration.238 Big 
Beer’s dominant market share, coupled with its efforts to regain lost 
market power, will help craft brewers establish the existence of a 
barrier to entry for the brewing industry. 
D.  Primary-Line RPA Claims 
Primary-line injury occurs when a business “hinders or seeks to 
hinder” its competition.239 A plaintiff may bring an RPA claim for 
primary- or secondary-line injury, but this Article focuses on primary-
line injury—which is the impact of predatory pricing on direct 
competitors.240 Although the Brooke Group test is the prerequisite for 
a predatory pricing claim, a plaintiff must prove one additional 
element to bring an RPA claim—direct competition.241 The Brooke 
 
 232. Barrier to Entry, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 233. See id. (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 227 (2d ed. 1977)). 
 234. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 699, 725. 
 235. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1432, 1448 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The 
combined lack of market share and entry barriers, the court said, indicated that ARCO lacked the 
power to charge prices above competitive levels as a means of recouping predatory losses.”). 
 236. Id. at 1434; see supra text accompanying note 104. 
 237. See supra Section III.A. 
 238. See supra Section III.D. 
 239. Primary-Line Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); cf. Secondary-Line 
Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Under the price-discrimination provisions of 
the [PRA], the act of hindering or seeking to hinder competition among a seller’s customers by 
selling substantially the same products at favorable prices to one customer, or a select group of 
customers, to the detriment of others.”). 
 240. Primary-Line Injury, supra note 239. 
 241. Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220–24 (1993). 
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Group test requires a plaintiff to show pricing below “an appropriate 
measure of its rival’s costs” and “that the competitor had a reasonable 
prospect of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”242 
Therefore, a plaintiff must show that the defendant is a direct 
competitor, and satisfy the two-prong Brooke Group test, to bring a 
successful RPA claim. 
E.  Sherman Act “Attempt” Elements 
Courts have held that a manufacturer can violate the Sherman Act 
by engaging in predatory pricing.243 A plaintiff must prove different 
elements if he or she wishes to file a Sherman Act claim in addition to 
an RPA claim.244 A Sherman Act predatory pricing claim is the more 
stringent version of an RPA claim.245 In the realm of an individual 
manufacturer engaging in predatory pricing, a plaintiff would file an 
“attempt” claim under section two of the Sherman Act.246 This section 
prohibits a person from attempting to monopolize any part of a 
trade.247 
Although the Sherman Act does not contain an explicit 
framework, courts have developed three elements that a plaintiff must 
prove in order to prevail.248 Subsection 1 contrasts predatory conduct 
and competition on the merits.249 Subsection 2 explains the specific 
intent to monopolize.250 Subsection 3 explains how a defendant must 
have a high likelihood of achieving a monopoly.251 
 
 242. Id. at 210 (emphasis added). 
 243. E.g., Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 406, 411 
(2d Cir. 1988) (affirming the district court’s ruling for the plaintiffs in a predatory pricing lawsuit), 
aff’d, 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
 244. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222 (“There are, to be sure, differences between the two 
statutes. . . . We interpret [section] 2 of the Sherman Act to condemn predatory pricing when it 
poses ‘a dangerous possibility of actual monopolization,’ whereas the [RPA] requires only that 
there be a ‘reasonable possibility’ of substantial injury to competition . . . .”) (first quoting Spectrum 
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993); and then Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco 
Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 434 (1983)). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Compare id. at 251 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (applying to individual persons, which 
includes businesses), with 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (prohibiting contracts and trusts from restraining 
trade). 
 247. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 248. Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 456. 
 249. See infra Subsection V.E.1. 
 250. See infra Subsection V.E.2. 
 251. See infra Subsection V.E.3. 
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1.  Element One: Predatory Conduct 
First, a plaintiff must prove the defendant engaged in predatory 
or anticompetitive conduct.252 Courts will delineate hypercompetitive 
conduct, which Areeda and Turner found to be the ideal scheme, from 
conduct that unfairly destroys competition.253 While hypercompetitive 
conduct drives prices down in a lawful manner, anticompetitive 
conduct includes unfair competition, peace agreements between 
competitors, and practices such as below-cost pricing.254 This element 
identifies conduct that is inconsistent with competition on the merits—
meaning competition “on the basis of product or service innovation, 
quality, and value.”255 
Here, Big Beer has engaged in a multitude of activities that could 
destroy competition and is inconsistent with competition on the 
merits.256 Big Beer engaged anticompetitive conduct when it limited 
its competitors’ access to ingredients, controlled distribution chains, 
and priced its products below AVC.257 These practices are inconsistent 
with competition on the merits because they stifle competition without 
consideration of innovation, quality, or value. Instead, Big Beer’s 
actions curtail craft brewers’ access to ingredients and markets—
which impedes smaller manufacturers’ ability to produce, innovate, or 
improve their products. 
2.  Element Two: Specific Intent 
Next, a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s “specific intent to 
destroy competition or build [a] monopoly.”258 While some courts 
have moved away from requiring specific intent for RPA claims, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed this element within its modern explanation 
 
 252. Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 456. 
 253. Compare id. at 458–59 (discussing that the purpose of this distinction is not to chill 
competition), with Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 711 (concluding that prices at or above AVC 
are the “competitive and socially optimal result”). 
 254. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 712 (“[M]arginal-cost pricing leads to a proper 
resource allocation and is consistent with competition on the merits.”); Rudolf Callmann, The 
Essence of Anti-Trust, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1100, 1112–13 (1949) (“Warfare between competitors 
may be waged by means unlawful per se such as boycotts, selling below cost, discriminatory 
practices, or by means which may be justified in the ordinary course of business such as patents, 
trade-marks, exclusive dealing agreements and the like.”). 
 255. Harry S. Gerla, Competition on the Merits—A Sound Industrial Policy for Antitrust Law, 
36 U. FLA. L. REV. 553, 554 (1984). 
 256. See supra Sections III.C–D. 
 257. See supra Section III.D; see infra Part VII. 
 258. Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953); Spectrum Sports, 
Inc., 506 U.S. at 456. 
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of the Sherman Act’s elements.259 A defendant’s desire to prevail over 
its rivals falls short of the required intent; rather, the defendant must 
exhibit “something more than an intent to compete vigorously.”260 The 
question of intent asks whether the challenged conduct is 
exclusionary, anticompetitive, or predatory.261 
Big Beer’s actions fall into all three of these categories. Cutting 
off access to hops and purchasing distribution chains is exclusionary 
because it prevents competition from producing beer or entering a 
wider market.262 Purchasing competitors and lobbying for legislation 
that creates pay-to-play activities is anticompetitive and exclusionary 
because it favors larger businesses.263 Pricing below AVC is predatory 
because it allows Big Beer to leverage its superior market power and 
resources to outlast its competition in a below-cost pricing battle.264 
Also, pricing below AVC is anticompetitive because, as Areeda and 
Turner explained, it moves away from competition on the merits.265 
Finally, none of the practices in this section constitute product-based 
competition. 
3.  Element Three: Probability of Achieving a Monopoly 
Finally, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a dangerous 
probability of achieving an actual monopoly.266 There are a series of 
factors that a plaintiff may utilize when attempting to satisfy this 
element, but two factors weigh heavier than the rest.267 First, plaintiffs 
who are successful in proving the probability element demonstrate that 
 
 259. E.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 456 (“[I]t is generally required that to demonstrate 
attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power.”); see Double H Plastics, Inc. v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 732 F.2d 351, 354 
(3d Cir. 1984) (“In order to establish a violation of section 2(a) [of the RPA], the plaintiff must 
show that the price discrimination either injured or threatened to injure competition. The plaintiff 
may do this either by market analysis or by proof of predatory intent. Here the plaintiff has offered 
no market analysis and instead has relied on evidence of predatory intent. Predatory intent may be 
shown either by express evidence or by inference from below-cost pricing.”). 
 260. Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 459. 
 261. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985). 
 262. See supra Section III.D. 
 263. See supra Sections III.C–D. 
 264. See supra Subsection V.C.3; see infra Part VII. 
 265. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 715. 
 266. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
 267. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 312–17 (Jonathan M. Jacobson et 
al. eds., 6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS] (including other factors that 
courts consider when examining the third element to Sherman Act attempt claims). 
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the defendant’s conduct occurred in the relevant market.268 Second, 
successful plaintiffs often show that the defendant possessed 
significant market power.269 However, it is possible that a plaintiff 
already addressed these factors because some jurisdictions include 
relevant market and/or market power as elements of an RPA claim.270 
Consequently, a plaintiff in these jurisdictions may simultaneously 
satisfy this element for both RPA and Sherman Act claims.271 
Today, Big Beer produces 72 percent of all beer in the United 
States, and its products are present in virtually every market.272 Big 
Beer has integrated horizontally by purchasing craft breweries and 
integrated vertically by controlling distribution chains.273 Despite its 
declining market power, Big Beer still earned nearly three times more 
money in retail sales than all of its craft competitors in 2017.274 Under 
the current market conditions, Big Beer still maintains market 
superiority and its pervasiveness makes it a competitor in nearly every 
United States market. 
VI.  STATE-LEVEL BELOW-COST PROHIBITIONS 
The Supremacy Clause established that the Constitution and 
federal laws are “the supreme Law[s] of the Land.”275 Expanding upon 
this concept, the Tenth Amendment allows states to exercise powers 
that are “not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.”276 
These two foundational principles create an interesting dichotomy 
 
 268. See Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 456 (observing that all circuit courts, except for the 
Ninth Circuit, adhere to these three elements for Sherman Act § 2 claims); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil 
Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir. 1964) (noting that relevant market is not in issue “[w]hen the 
charge is attempt (or conspiracy) to monopolize, rather than monopolization”), abrogated by 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993). 
 269. Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 456 (“In order to determine whether there is a dangerous 
probability of monopolization, courts have found it necessary to consider the relevant market and 
the defendant’s ability to lessen or destroy competition in that market.”). 
 270. See supra Section V.C. 
 271. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 267 (discussing how market share and 
barriers to entry are the two most important factors for this element). 
 272. NUMBER OF BREWERS REPORT, supra note 105; see also Cat Wolinski, The Cost of a Case 
of Beer in Every State, VINEPAIR (Feb. 7, 2019), https://vinepair.com/booze-news/cost-of-beer-
case-24-pack-every-state/ (reporting on the average price of Bud Light and Miller Light in all fifty 
states). 
 273. See supra Section III.D. 
 274. Gerhart, supra note 107. 
 275. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 276. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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with respect to antitrust because individual states passed the first 
antitrust laws, which prompted the federal government to act.277 
The federal government did not simply follow the states’ lead, but 
it explained that its role is to reinforce state laws.278 Nearly one 
hundred years after Congress set out to supplement state laws, the FTC 
stated its position that federal law prohibits predatory pricing, but 
predation and below-cost pricing are different.279 Section A discusses 
how numerous states have prohibited below-cost pricing in the 
absence of federal enforcement.280 Section B explains the various 
circumstances where states permit a manufacturer to price its goods 
below cost.281 
A.  Below-Cost Pricing Prohibitions 
The states’ approach to below-cost pricing mirrors struggles on 
the federal level because states disagree on the meaning of the word 
“cost.”282 For example, most states interpret cost to be a combination 
of fixed and variable costs, but some states incorporate a markup to 
offset incurred costs.283 One way that state below-cost pricing laws 
differ from federal laws is that some states explicitly look at how the 
practice impacts competitors—not just competition.284 In 2005, the 
FTC explained that eleven states do not have any below-cost pricing 
prohibitions, and the remaining states have two types of below-cost 
pricing laws: general and specific.285 
General below-cost pricing prohibitions ban selling any retail 
merchandise below its cost.286 In total, there are twenty-two states that 
 
 277. See supra Part II. 
 278. H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, pt. 2, at 9 (1914). 
 279. See id. (documenting Congress’s discussion on May 6, 1914 concerning supplementing 
state antitrust law); see also Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 2 (“While 
federal antitrust law prohibits predatory pricing, there is no specific federal prohibition on below-
cost sales.”). 
 280. See infra Section VI.A. 
 281. See infra Section VI.B. 
 282. Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 2. 
 283. Id. at 2–3. 
 284. Id. at 3. 
 285. See id. at 2, 9–10 (omitting Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia from its list of states with general or specific below-
cost pricing prohibitions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-16-4 (repealed 2012) (prohibiting below-cost 
pricing for gasoline); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-7 (repealed 2008) (barring below-cost pricing in 
general). 
 286. Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 2. 
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currently have general below-cost pricing prohibitions.287 By 
prohibiting all below-cost retail sales, these states prevent businesses 
from pricing staple goods—e.g., milk and bread—below cost to lure 
in shoppers who then purchase other goods.288 
Specific pricing bans prohibit selling particular goods, such as 
“gasoline, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, or milk” below cost.289 
Thirty-two states, including the District of Columbia, have enacted 
specific prohibitions on below-cost pricing.290 Fourteen of those states 
also have a general ban on pricing all goods below cost.291 
In recent years, some states without gasoline-specific below-cost 
pricing laws entertained the idea of prohibiting below-cost gasoline 
sales.292 Between 2003–2005, four states sought to prohibit selling 
gasoline below cost.293 A fifth state, Wisconsin, asked the FTC to 
review its below-cost pricing law.294 Although Congress charged the 
FTC with enforcing laws that prohibit unfair competition, the FTC 
intervened in the state-legislative process by arguing against the 
passage of below-cost pricing laws.295 In the end, four states 
 
 287. Compare id. at 9–10 (identifying Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as having general prohibitions), with 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-23-7 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.) (regulating below-cost 
pricing for only cigarettes), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.12 (West, Westlaw through File 12 of 
the 134th Gen. Assemb. (2021–2022)) (pertaining only to cigarettes), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-
5-7 (repealed 2008) (rendering below-cost pricing for all merchandise impermissible). 
 288. See Chris Fleisher, Loss-Leaders: Predatory or Practical?, AM. ECON. ASS’N (Mar. 24, 
2017), https://www.aeaweb.org/research/loss-leading-bans-retail-competition (labeling businesses 
that price staple goods low to lure in other business “loss leaders”). 
 289. Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 2. 
 290. See id. at 9–10 (identifying Alabama, Delaware, Florida, George, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, and 
Washington as states with specific bans on below-cost pricing only); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-23-7 
(creating a specific ban on below-cost pricing for cigarettes); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.12  
(prohibiting below-cost sales for cigarettes only); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-16-4 (repealed 2012) 
(prohibiting below-cost sales for motor fuel). 
 291. Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 9–10 (observing that Arkansas, 
Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah have both general 
and specific below-cost pricing prohibitions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-16-4 (repealed 2012); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 13-5-7 (repealed 2008). But see MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-23-7; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1333.12 (creating a specific prohibition of below-cost sales of cigarettes only). 
 292. Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 7. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Letter from the U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Shirley Krug, State Representative, Wis. 
(Oct. 15, 2003) (on file with author). 
 295. Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 7. 
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succumbed to the FTC’s arguments and did not prohibit below-cost 
pricing—but Wisconsin’s prohibition remains intact.296 
B.  Below-Cost Pricing Exceptions 
Most of the twenty-five states that prohibit general below-cost 
pricing allow the practice under certain circumstances.297 Some states 
treat permissible instances of below-cost pricing as an exception to the 
statute, but others consider these scenarios a defense to a prima facie 
case of predation.298 Similarly, statutes such as California’s Unfair 
Practices Act classify permissible below-cost pricing as an 
“exclusion,” while the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act labels these 
circumstances “exempted sales.”299 No matter the label, states that 
situationally permit below-cost pricing generally do so under the same 
few scenarios. 
Only two of the twenty-two states with general below-cost pricing 
prohibitions do not have exceptions in their statutes.300 A third state 
created five exceptions that are completely distinct from every other 
states’ exemptions.301 The remaining nineteen states each allow 
between five and nine different exceptions, many of which are 
substantively the same.302 Thirteen of these nineteen states have 
 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 2. 
 298. Id. at 3–4. 
 299. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000, 17050 (Deering 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 
§§ 598.1, 598.6 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.). 
 300. See generally NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-801 to -831 (West, Westlaw through the end 
of the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 106th Leg. (2020)) (prohibiting below-cost pricing generally, but not 
creating any exceptions to the law); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-110 to -200 (West, Westlaw through 
the 2020 Sess.) (barring its manufacturers from pricing goods below cost, but not creating instances 
where they may price their goods below cost). 
 301. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-107 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 305 of the First Regular 
Session of the Sixty-Sixth Idaho Legislature, which convened on Monday, January 11, 2021). 
 302. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-209 (West, Westlaw through laws passed by the 2021 Regular 
Session of the 93rd Arkansas General Assembly effective through May 1, 2021, and changes made 
by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission received through April 15, 2021); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 17050; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-110 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Extraordinary 
Sess. and the Nov. 3, 2020 election); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481-6 (West, Westlaw through the 
end of the 2020 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.040 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. 
Sess. and the Nov. 3, 2020 election); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:426 (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d 
Extraordinary Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1203 (West, Westlaw through the 2019 2d 
Reg. Sess. of the 129th Leg.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 11-402 (West, Westlaw through 2020 
Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14G (West, Westlaw through 
Ch. 226 of the 2020 2d Ann. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.06 (West, Westlaw through 2020 
Reg. Sess. and 1st through 7th Spec. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-213 (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-10-07 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. 
of the 66th Legis. Assemb.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.6 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. 
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between one and three unique exceptions, which appear in very few 
other states’ exception lists.303 
The nineteen states that situationally permit below-cost pricing 
have all codified the same four exceptions. These states permit a 
business to price below cost when hosting a clearance sale, preventing 
loss due to perishable goods, marking down damaged products, or 
selling by court order.304 The second most common exception permits 
a business to sell its goods below cost to match a competitor who is 
selling lawfully priced goods.305 Seventeen states have enacted this 
exception, which recognizes that production costs vary between 
manufacturers.306 
The remaining three exceptions are also very common, but not as 
widely accepted as the others. Twelve states permit a business to sell 
its goods below cost when contracted with a government entity.307 
Eleven states allow below-cost pricing when a business sells its goods 
to a charitable agency or for disaster relief purposes.308 Finally, ten 
 
Sess. of 57th Leg.); 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 216 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. 
Sess. Act 95); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-5 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 79 of the 2020 2d 
Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-204 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2020 2d 
Extraordinary Sess. of the 111th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-11A-8 (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.30 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 
186); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-110 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Budget Sess. of Wyo. Leg.). 
 303. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.6(8) (permitting below-cost pricing at any bona 
fide auction); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481-6(5) (creating an exception for below-cost pricing as 
it pertains to service stores for the United States military); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:426(9) (allowing 
a manufacturer to sell its merchandise below cost). 
 304. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-209(f)(1) (permitting below-cost pricing when a 
merchant is closing out its stock); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.06(1) (allowing a manufacturer to 
price perishable goods below cost—if doing so would prevent loss); 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 216(c) (establishing an exception for businesses to sell damaged goods below cost); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 47-25-204(9) (sanctioning below-cost pricing if done so because of a court order). 
 305. E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:426(7) (“Where merchandise is sold in good faith to meet that 
competition which permits a competitor to sell at a lesser price where such competitor is able to do 
so without violating the terms and conditions of this Subpart . . . .”). 
 306. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-209(f)(4); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17050(d); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-110(1)(d); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481-6(4); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 365.040(4); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:426(7); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1203(8); MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW § 11-402(8); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14G(h); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 325D.06(4); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-213(6); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-10-07(7); 73 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 216(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-204(8); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 47-11A-8(e); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.30(6)(a)(7); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-110(a)(iv). 
 307. LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:426(6); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1203(7); MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 11-402(6); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14G(g); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-
213(7); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-10-07(6); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.6(6); 73 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 216(f); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-5(7); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-
204(7); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-11A-8(h); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.30(6)(a)(6). 
 308. LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:426(5); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1203(6); MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 11-402(5); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14G(f); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-
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states permit a business to sell below cost during its final liquidation 
to mitigate additional financial hardship that it would incur 
otherwise.309 This list is not exhaustive, but it contains the most 
common below-cost pricing exceptions. No other exception appears 
as consistently as the items in this list. 
VII.  BRINGING A BELOW-COST PRICING CLAIM 
The FTC believes Big Beer’s pricing practices are good for 
consumers and do not constitute steps toward creating a monopoly 
under the Sherman Act or the RPA.310 Contrary to the FTC, twenty-
two states have enacted general below-cost pricing prohibitions to 
protect competition and consumers from the early stages of a 
monopoly.311 Circuit courts have discussed how below-cost pricing 
may harm consumers—a monopolist eradicates competition by 
pricing below cost and raises prices to recoup its losses.312 Circuit-by-
circuit caselaw has established a jurisdictional quagmire where would-
be plaintiffs must satisfy a litany of evolving requirements to meet an 
indefinite standard.313 Without Supreme Court intervention, it is 
unclear whether a craft brewer can succeed in a below-cost pricing 
lawsuit against Big Beer under the Sherman Act or the RPA. 
A craft brewer must make multiple considerations before it looks 
to jurisdictional measures of cost.314 First, a craft brewer should be 
selective in who it names as a defendant because Big Beer is 
 
10-07(5); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.6(5); 73 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 216(e); 6 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-5(6); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-204(6); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-11A-
8(g); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.30(6)(a)(5). 
 309. LA. STAT. ANN. § 1:426(4); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1203(5); MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 11-402(4); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14G(e); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-
10-07(4); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.6(4); 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 216(d); 6 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-5(5); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-204(5); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 100.30(6)(a)(4). 
 310. See Roundtable on Resale Below Cost Laws, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
 311. See supra Part VI. 
 312. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 
1035 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Predation exists when the justification of these prices is based, not on their 
effectiveness in minimizing losses, but on their tendency to eliminate rivals and create a market 
structure enabling the seller to recoup his losses.”); Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 
76, 89 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Thus it is not enough that the predator survive his own predatory prices; he 
must be able to earn monopoly profits in the not-too-distant future.”). 
 313. See supra Part V. 
 314. See supra Section V.C (identifying four non-Brooke Group factors—relevant market, 
rational economic motive, market power, and barrier to entry—that courts use to dismiss predatory 
pricing cases). 
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comprised of four different large companies.315 Next, a craft brewer-
plaintiff must be sure that the defendant is a direct competitor because 
there can be no RPA claim without competition.316 Finally, a plaintiff 
must show that it can satisfy the four non-Brooke Group 
requirements.317 
A craft brewer-plaintiff should only bring a below-cost pricing 
claim if it can satisfy the criteria above. The next step to determine the 
viability of a potential claim is to examine jurisdictional measures of 
cost. Section A discusses predatory pricing claims in minority 
jurisdictions.318 Section B examines how hardline and burden-shifting 
jurisdictions would approach Big Beer pricing below AVC.319 Section 
C applies the hardline and burden-shifting approaches to a fact pattern 
where Big Beer prices are at marginal cost.320 Section D explains why 
the burden-shifting approach is the most adaptable and comprehensive 
answer to the measure of cost predicament.321 
A.  Minority Jurisdiction Analysis 
Minority jurisdictions avoid adopting a measure of cost, dismiss 
predation cases using jurisdiction-specific requirements, and even 
permit below-cost pricing.322 Here, the only thing a craft brewer can 
do is ensure it satisfies all of the non-Brooke Group requirements.323 
The D.C., First, and Tenth Circuits will continue to operate without 
guidance so long as the Supreme Court avoids selecting a measure of 
cost. 
The First and Tenth Circuits are entirely unpredictable because, 
without a defined measure of cost, they are free to change their 
approach to predation at any moment. As a consequence, cost 
uncertainty should discourage a craft brewer from filing a below-cost 
pricing claim under the Sherman Act or the RPA in these circuits. State 
law may be the better avenue to recovery for craft brewers in the First 
 
 315. See Robertson, supra note 13 (indicating that Anheuser-Busch InBev, MillerCoors, 
Constellation Brands, and Heineken comprise “Big Beer”). 
 316. Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993). 
 317. See supra Section V.C. 
 318. See infra Section VII.A. 
 319. See infra Section VII.B. 
 320. See infra Section VII.C. 
 321. See infra Section VII.D. 
 322. See supra Subsection V.B.1. 
 323. See supra Section V.C. 
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and Tenth Circuits because the outcomes are currently unpredictable 
under federal law.324 
Outcomes are more predictable in the D.C. Circuit because that 
court explained below-cost pricing is legal—even when done by a 
monopolist.325 This circuit’s views on below-cost pricing make it 
almost impossible for a craft brewer to bring a successful below-cost 
pricing claim. A craft brewer should only bring a below-cost pricing 
claim in the D.C. Circuit if its sole objective is to reach the Supreme 
Court. Reaching the Supreme Court should be the craft brewer’s goal 
for two reasons. First, the D.C. Circuit rejects the idea that below-cost 
pricing violates the Sherman Act and the RPA.326 Second, the District 
of Columbia has one state-level below-cost pricing prohibition that 
only applies to cigarettes.327 Without Supreme Court intervention, 
craft brewers in the District of Columbia cannot prevail at the state or 
federal level in an antitrust lawsuit predicated on below-cost pricing. 
B.  Below-AVC Pricing Analysis 
The following fact pattern illustrates a below-AVC pricing 
scenario; suppose the following facts are true. Producing one barrel of 
craft beer and generating a profit in today’s market has an AVC of 
$180. Big Beer has purchased numerous craft breweries and markets 
those brands as “craft” beer.328 Further, Big Beer sells its craft-like 
beer for $150 per barrel—$30 below AVC. Lastly, suppose there is no 
evidence that Big Beer intends to harm competition or establish a 
monopoly. 
Both hardline and burden-shifting jurisdictions would treat this 
scenario as predation for the purpose of bringing a lawsuit under the 
RPA—even without evidence of predatory intent.329 Big Beer is 
 
 324. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Reg. 
Sess. and the Nov. 3, 2020 election) (“It is unlawful . . . to sell, offer for sale, or advertise for sale 
any product or service for less than the cost of the product or service with the intent to both injure 
competitors and destroy competition.”), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1204-A (West, 
Westlaw through the 2019 2d Reg. Sess. of the 129th Leg.) (“It is unlawful . . . to sell such 
merchandise at less than the cost thereof to such vendor with the purpose or intent to injure 
competitors or destroy competition.”), with supra note 8 (noting the First Circuit avoided adopting 
a standard measure of cost and the Tenth Circuit stated “the Supreme Court nor we have taken a 
position on which of various cost measures is the definitive one”). 
 325. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 326. Id. 
 327. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4522 (West, Westlaw through Dec. 8, 2020). 
 328. Bland, supra note 135. 
 329. See supra Section V.B. 
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pricing its craft products $30 below AVC, which is the predation 
threshold in both hardline and burden-shifting jurisdictions.330 
Therefore, every circuit—except the D.C., First, and Tenth Circuits—
would presume the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of 
predation.331 The burden of proof falls on the defendant to overcome 
a strong presumption of predation and explain why its behavior was 
not predatory. 
C.  Marginal-Cost Pricing Analysis 
To set the stage for marginal-cost pricing, assume all of the facts 
below are true. First, the most efficient brewer can produce one barrel 
of beer and generate profit for the AVC of $180. Again, Big Beer has 
purchased craft competitors and sells those brands as craft beer.332 
Instead of Big Beer selling its product for $150 per barrel, it is now 
selling the beer for $181 per barrel—$1 above AVC. Also, assume 
that Big Beer conducted a market study and learned its competitors 
would go out of business if the price of beer was $181 per barrel. This 
fictional study revealed that the least efficient competitors would go 
out of business within six months at this price point, and the most 
efficient brewers would only last one year.333 Finally, assume that the 
plaintiff possesses a memorandum from the defendant communicating 
its plan to destroy all competition within one year by pricing just above 
AVC.334 
This scenario is where hardline and burden-shifting jurisdictions 
diverge because Big Beer is pricing its products in the marginal-cost 
range.335 Hardline jurisdictions are generally rigid in applying the 
AVC threshold and would focus on Big Beer pricing its products in 
 
 330. See supra Section V.B.2–3. 
 331. See supra Section V.B. 
 332. Bland, supra note 135. 
 333. See McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1491–92 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[The 
defendant] obtained a copy of McGahee’s SBA loan documents and other documents related to his 
financial position.”) 
 334. See id. at 1504 (discussing how the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant 
circulated an “internal memorandum declaring ‘contribute to [plaintiff’s] financial problems’ to be 
a goal for [defendant’s] local office”). 
 335. Cf. id. at 1502, 1504, 1507 (relying heavily on Utah Pie, a highly controversial decision, 
to infer predatory intent from the defendant’s below marginal-cost pricing—not the memorandum 
calling for contributing to the plaintiff’s financial problems—to reverse the district court’s decision 
for the defendant); see Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 
(1993) (“[Utah Pie] has been criticized on the grounds that such low standards of competitive injury 
are at odds with the antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price 
competition.”). 
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Areeda and Turner’s “competitive and socially optimal” range.336 
Despite the strong evidence of predatory intent, hardline jurisdictions 
would likely find that Big Beer did not engage in predation because 
the defendant priced above AVC.337 
Unlike below-AVC pricing—where the defendant has the burden 
of proof—burden-shifting jurisdictions place the burden on the 
plaintiff to show the defendant behaved predatorially.338 The Sixth, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits allow a plaintiff to rebut the presumption 
of innocuous competitive pricing—which addresses Areeda and 
Turner’s observation that marginal-cost pricing can be predatory.339 
Under these facts, the plaintiff has an excellent case for predation in a 
burden-shifting jurisdiction because the report and memorandum are 
strong evidence of predation. 
D.  What Is an Appropriate Measure of Cost? 
If all facts heavily favored a craft brewer-plaintiff in a below-
AVC pricing claim, the case’s outcome would depend solely on 
geography—not precedent or any judicial standard. Using each circuit 
court’s adopted measure of cost to predict how it would decide 
plaintiff-favoring facts, the circuits would likely split nine to three for 
the plaintiff.340 Minority jurisdictions are likely to avoid a decision 
that would select an appropriate measure of cost, while hardline and 
burden-shifting jurisdictions would likely find for the plaintiff.341 
Unfortunately, below-AVC pricing is only part of the problem. 
Marginal-cost pricing with predatory intent is the other issue because 
it could fall within the RPA’s “unreasonably low prices for the 
purpose of destroying competition.”342 A clear majority recognizes 
AVC as the line between competition and predation, but discrepancies 
still exist that produce different results along jurisdictional lines. It is 
the Supreme Court’s role to reconcile this judicial discrepancy, 
 
 336. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 711. 
 337. See, e.g., Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432 (7th 
Cir. 1980) (“In selling at a level which was above its average variable cost Martin Marietta acted 
in an economically rational manner, derived immediate economic benefit from its sales, and did 
not engage in the ‘deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out of 
the market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the absence of 
competition.’” (quoting Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 698)). 
 338. See supra Subsection V.B.3. 
 339. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 710–11; see supra Subsection V.B.3. 
 340. See supra Section V.B. 
 341. See supra Section V.B. 
 342. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2018). 
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provide guidance as to the appropriate measure of cost, and align the 
circuit courts. Without a clearly defined judicial standard, an RPA 
claim produces results that are far less-consistent than the National 
Football League’s tie-breaking procedures—which can end in a coin 
toss.343 
Nine different circuit courts have built up an extensive body of 
caselaw showing AVC is a reasonable threshold for predatory 
pricing.344 Regardless of whether these circuit courts ascribe to the 
hardline or the burden-shifting approach, they consider pricing below-
AVC to be predatory.345 Circuit courts that follow the hardline 
approach more closely align with Areeda and Turner, while the 
burden-shifting courts diverge from the professors.346 The Supreme 
Court must answer three questions to provide sufficient guidance on 
this matter. First, it must determine if AVC is the appropriate measure 
of cost. Second, it should explain whether there are scenarios when 
below-cost pricing is permissible. Last, the Supreme Court must 
decide whether the hardline or burden-shifting approach best serves 
the RPA’s objectives. 
To thoroughly answer these questions, the Supreme Court should 
balance practicality, purposivism, state law, and the Areeda-Turner 
framework. Subsection 1 explains why AVC is the appropriate 
threshold between competition and predation.347 Subsection 2 
explains why courts should not foreclose all instances of below-cost 
pricing, simply because Areeda and Turner did not discuss them.348 
Subsection 3 discusses why the burden-shifting approach better aligns 
with why Congress enacted the RPA.349 
 
 343. See NFL Tiebreaking Procedures, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, https://www.nfl.com/ 
standings/tiebreakingprocedures (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (“If, at the end of the regular season, 
two or more clubs in the same division finish with identical won-lost-tied percentages, the 
following steps will be taken until a champion is determined. . . . 1. Head-to-head (best won-lost-
tied percentage in games between the clubs). 2. Best won-lost-tied percentage in games played 
within the division. 3. Best won-lost-tied percentage in common games. 4. Best won-lost-tied 
percentage in games played within the conference. 5. Strength of victory. 6. Strength of schedule. 
7. Best combined ranking among conference teams in points scored and points allowed. 8. Best 
combined ranking among all teams in points scored and points allowed. 9. Best net points in 
common games. 10. Best net points in all games. 11. Best net touchdowns in all games. 12. Coin 
toss.”). 
 344. See supra note 8; supra Subsections V.B.2–3. 
 345. See supra Subsections V.B.2–3. 
 346. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 710–11 (arguing that courts should consider above-
AVC pricing non-predatory). 
 347. See infra Subsection VII.D.1. 
 348. See infra Subsection VII.D.2. 
 349. See infra Subsection VII.D.3. 
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1.  AVC: An Uncontested, Universal Measure of Cost 
Areeda and Turner first discussed a universal measure of cost in 
1975, and courts first used the term “appropriate measure of cost” in 
1984.350 Since then, circuit courts have all taken a unique approach to 
resolving cases centered on the ever-changing cost concept. Today, 
each circuit offers its own flavor of the appropriate measure of cost, 
but there are three general views on the matter.351 By selecting an 
appropriate measure of cost, the Supreme Court would resolve this 
discrepancy and create a nationwide standard for federal courts. 
In 1975, Areeda and Turner recommended that courts use AVC 
as the measure of cost for economic reasons.352 According to the 
professors, pricing above AVC is the best form of competition 
whereas pricing below AVC is not competition on the merits.353 
Essentially, if a business prices its goods below AVC, price controls 
the competition—not the product—and wealthier businesses gain an 
unfair advantage. 
Since Areeda and Turner’s article, nine out of twelve circuit 
courts have adopted AVC as a measure of cost.354 The remaining three 
circuits do not reject AVC on any basis other than the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to adopt a standard measure of cost.355 In fact, the measures of 
cost at play in the United States are completely binary—a jurisdiction 
either uses AVC or nothing.356 Jurisdictions that have adopted a 
measure of cost separate into two categories, both of which utilize 
AVC as the measure of cost for predation.357 Therefore, the Supreme 
Court can continue on its current path—which has produced 
jurisdictional disarray—use AVC as a baseline measure of cost for 
predatory pricing claims, or implement a different standard altogether. 
The Supreme Court should adopt AVC as the measure of cost because 
many prominent legal scholars, economic scholars, and courts have 
vetted its appropriateness and there are no other alternatives. 
 
 350. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at passim (discussing ATC, AVC, and marginal-cost 
pricing to help courts select a measure of cost by which to judge predatory pricing); S. Pac. 
Commc’ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 351. See supra Section V.B. 
 352. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 711. 
 353. Id. at 711–12. 
 354. See supra Subsections V.B.2–3. 
 355. See supra Subsection V.B.1. 
 356. See supra Section V.B. 
 357. See supra Subsections V.B.2–3. 
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2.  Integrating Common-Sense Exceptions with the Areeda-Turner 
Framework 
Time, experience, and innovation have demonstrated that there 
are circumstances where the law should allow a business to sell its 
goods below cost.358 The complexities of state below-cost pricing 
exceptions show that the Areeda-Turner framework, albeit 
comprehensive, is not flawless.359 States with general below-cost 
pricing prohibitions have identified valid reasons for a business to 
price its goods below cost, which Areeda and Turner declined to 
discuss. 
It is neither reasonable nor equitable to prevent a business from 
mitigating loss by marking down goods that are damaged or 
approaching an expiration date. These exceptions are two of the most 
common circumstances where states permit a manufacturer to price 
goods below cost.360 These exceptions to below-cost pricing highlight 
bona fide reasons for a business to price its goods below AVC.361 
Courts and legislatures that fail to recognize these exceptions—which 
prevent loss without harming competition or competitors—are forcing 
a rigid, unforgiving system on businesses in their jurisdiction.362 
In the absence of clearly defined statutory exceptions, the 
Supreme Court should approach below-cost pricing using the state’s 
focus on equitability. The Sherman Act and the RPA have 
complementary objectives, which include protecting competition and 
consumers.363 While below-cost pricing related to liquidation, 
spoilage, or damage may briefly inconvenience market rivals, courts 
have uniformly held that antitrust laws do not protect competitors.364 
 
 358. See supra Section VI.B (discussing how states permit below-cost pricing to liquidate a 
business, have a clearance sale, prevent loss from spoilage, and meet competition). 
 359. Compare supra Section VI.B (identifying multiple exceptions where pricing below cost 
proves beneficial—such as preventing loss due to spoilage or in a final liquidation), with Areeda & 
Turner, supra note 58, at 712–16 (explaining that promotional pricing and meeting competition are 
the two allowable exceptions to below-cost pricing). 
 360. See supra text accompanying note 300 (noting that nineteen of twenty-two states that have 
general below-cost pricing prohibitions permit below-cost selling in these instances). 
 361. See supra Section VI.B. 
 362. Compare, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:426(4) (West, Westlaw through 2020 2d 
Extraordinary Sess.) (allowing a business that is closing to sell below cost to liquidate its 
inventory), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17050 (Deering 2019) (permitting a business to sell 
goods below cost during a clearance sale but not when liquidating its inventory). 
 363. See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 1 (observing that antitrust laws protect competition, 
which benefits consumers). 
 364. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Taken as a whole, 
the legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not 
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Therefore, the Supreme Court should permit below-cost pricing 
exceptions that do not contravene the spirit of the antitrust laws—such 
exceptions protect non-predatory businesses from loss without 
impacting competition. 
3.  Burden-Shifting: Clear Definitions with Flexibility 
The RPA made it unlawful “to sell, or contract to sell, goods at 
unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or 
eliminating a competitor.”365 In 1936, Congress explained that it 
intended to “prevent the large corporate chains from selling below cost 
in certain localities” from destroying competition.366 Nevertheless, 
Areeda and Turner explained that courts should allow marginal-cost 
pricing, without qualification or exception, despite the fact that this 
practice can eliminate small-but-efficient competitors.367 
The Areeda-Turner framework laid the foundation for the 
hardline approach because it declared above-AVC prices legal and 
below-AVC prices illegal.368 However, the burden-shifting approach 
addresses the issue of pricing to destroy competition—a problem that 
both Congress and the Areeda-Turner framework discussed.369 
Although AVC may be the hardline between competition and 
predation, predatory pricing can still occur in the marginal-cost 
range.370 Maintaining AVC as the threshold between competition and 
predation, while prohibiting predatory pricing at marginal cost, is the 
precise problem that the burden-shifting framework addresses.371 
If the Supreme Court adopted the Areeda-Turner framework 
outright, it would overlook a business’s ability to sell at marginal cost 
with the intent to destroy competition.372 Manufacturers with 
sufficient market power can still destroy small, efficient competitors 
 
competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend 
to lessen competition.”). 
 365. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2018). 
 366. 80 CONG. REC. 8,235 (1936). 
 367. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 710–11. 
 368. Compare id. at 711–12 (explaining AVC to be the threshold between competition and 
predation), with supra Subsection V.B.2 (rejecting the burden-shifting approach by holding 
everything above AVC to be competition and everything below it to be predation). 
 369. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 711–12; see supra text accompanying notes 44, 57 
(discussing various predatory practices, including below-cost pricing, in legislative sessions before 
enacting the Clayton Act and the RPA). 
 370. Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 710–11. 
 371. See supra Subsection V.B.3. 
 372. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 58, at 710–11 (indicating that courts should permit 
pricing at marginal cost—even if it destroys competition). 
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by pricing in the marginal-cost range under the hardline approach.373 
The burden-shifting framework neither diverges from AVC as the 
measure of cost nor limits the law’s ability to prevent monopolistic 
activities in the marginal-cost range.374 It reinforces the idea that AVC 
is the threshold between competition and predation by imposing 
presumptions of illegality for below-AVC pricing and legality for 
above-AVC pricing.375 This framework provides courts with a static 
definition for an appropriate measure of cost and remains flexible 
enough to prevent above-AVC pricing intended to destroy 
competition. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Currently, a craft-brewer plaintiff could bring identical below-
AVC claims in multiple circuits and receive different verdicts—
despite the circuit courts applying the same law to the same facts. 
Construing pleadings “so as to do justice,” a craft brewer should be 
able to prevail in below-AVC pricing claims based on notions of 
justice and equitability—not geography.376 Unfortunately, without 
Supreme Court intervention, geography becomes an important factor 
in below-cost antitrust claims.377 This failure of the American legal 
system does not fall squarely on the shoulders of the Supreme Court; 
however, the Supreme Court can remedy the problem.378 
Three factors contribute to the lack of uniformity in below-cost 
pricing lawsuits. First, the FTC fails to recognize that below-cost 
pricing can be a precursor to a monopoly.379 Second, the FTC actively 
interferes with states that are seeking to pass below-cost pricing 
prohibitions.380 Finally, the Supreme Court has avoided the measure 
 
 373. Id. 
 374. See Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1360 (8th Cir. 1989) (“At prices above [AVC] the 
plaintiff must overcome a strong presumption of legality by showing other factors indicating that 
the price charged is anticompetitive. At prices below [AVC], the burden of showing non-predation 
falls on the defendant.”). 
 375. See supra Subsection V.B.3. 
 376. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e). 
 377. See, e.g., supra Section VII.A (observing that, under the RPA, craft brewers cannot 
recover for below-AVC pricing claims in some jurisdictions but may be able to recover in 
jurisdictions that have adopted the AVC hardline approach). 
 378. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897) 
(“[C]ongress is the body to amend [the law], and not this court, by a process of judicial legislation 
. . . .”). 
 379. See supra Part IV. 
 380. See supra Part IV. 
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of cost question—which created a legal nightmare that has 
discouraged plaintiffs from filing below-cost pricing claims.381 
Businesses can bring federal below-cost pricing claims under the 
Sherman Act, Clayton Act, or the RPA. A link between these laws is 
that Congress enacted them to protect markets from dominance by 
large businesses.382 These acts’ legislative histories show that 
Congress was concerned with protecting competition and consumers 
from monopolistic, anticompetitive business practices.383 One such 
activity involves a large manufacturer pricing its goods below cost in 
an attempt to remove competitors from the market. The RPA explicitly 
forbids pricing below cost to destroy competition, but it does so 
without defining cost.384 
Federal below-cost pricing claims are rare and unlikely to succeed 
because they are stuck in a catch-22. This paradoxical loop requires a 
plaintiff to reach the Supreme Court, in an unstable system that 
produces inconsistent outcomes, before the Court will create a uniform 
standard. Judges understand the difficulties of succeeding in a federal 
below-cost pricing lawsuit—there are numerous cases where the judge 
discusses this fact.385 The uncertainty around an appropriate measure 
of cost casts doubt over the viability of any below-cost pricing lawsuit. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly evaded defining a 
measure of cost—which would bring stability—and that avoidance 
further propagates the chaos.386 
The Brooke Group test was a good first step toward resolving 
federal below-cost pricing claims, but the Supreme Court’s sole 
contribution has proved insufficient by itself. Since its creation, the 
Brooke Group test has provided structure to below-cost pricing 
analyses, but circuit courts have developed their own interpretation of 
the test.387 Circuit courts split nine to three, with the majority adopting 
AVC as the measure of cost and the minority waiting for the Supreme 
Court’s verdict on the matter.388 Although the nine-circuit majority 
 
 381. See supra Subsection V.B.1. 
 382. See supra Part II. 
 383. See supra Section II.A. 
 384. See supra Subsection II.A.3. 
 385. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) 
(“[P]redatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”). 
 386. See supra notes 8, 177 (identifying multiple cases where the Supreme Court could have 
declared a measure of cost, but it denied certiorari instead). 
 387. See supra note 8; see also supra Sections V.A–B (examining the Brooke Group test and 
the various circuit splits that emerged after the publication of the Areeda-Turner framework). 
 388. See supra Section V.B. 
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adopted AVC as a measure of cost, these circuits are internally divided 
and approach predatory pricing in two distinct ways.389 Today, the 
Brooke Group test is not the largest hurdle for a craft brewer to 
overcome—it is the jurisdictional minutiae.390 
Courts require a plaintiff to prove numerous things in a below-
cost pricing lawsuit, and some weigh heavier than others. Some of the 
most important factors require a defendant to have reason to 
monopolize, sufficient market power, taken steps to monopolize, and 
a likelihood of succeeding.391 The brewing industry’s history provides 
evidence to support a claim of below-cost pricing against Big Beer.392 
Prior to President Carter legalizing homebrewing, Big Beer enjoyed 
market dominance and high beer prices.393 The market began to shift 
over the past forty years, which saw the price of beer fall by 17 percent 
and Big Beer’s market share drop by 20 percent.394 Today, Big Beer 
produces 72 percent of all domestic beer; however, that number has 
been declining since 1983 and large brewers are continually 
attempting to regain their 92 percent market share.395 
Although Big Beer’s behavior has created favorable facts for a 
below-cost pricing claim, courts’ non-uniform application of the RPA 
discourages would-be plaintiffs from bringing a claim. The FTC’s 
stance on below-cost pricing buttresses this unfavorable scenario and 
may have a chilling effect on craft brewers seeking justice in federal 
court. Until federal courts begin to apply antitrust laws as Congress 
intended—to supplement state laws—select states are a better venue 
for below-cost pricing lawsuits.396 
Without uniform application of federal laws that prohibit 
unreasonable pricing to destroy competition, twenty-two states offer 
the best chance of recovery for craft brewers.397 These states have 
taken it upon themselves to enact prohibitions that are nearly identical 
to the federal laws the FTC refuses to enforce.398 Most states with 
 
 389. See supra Subsections V.B.2–3. 
 390. See supra Part V. 
 391. See supra Part V. 
 392. See supra Sections III.C–D. 
 393. See supra Sections III.A–B. 
 394. See supra Sections III.A–B. 
 395. See supra Section III.A. 
 396. See supra Section II.A.2; Part V. 
 397. See supra Section VI.A. 
 398. Compare supra Section VI.A (discussing twenty-two states that prohibit below-cost 
pricing for all goods sold within their borders), with supra Part V (explaining how a majority of the 
circuit courts interpret the RPA to prohibit selling goods below AVC). 
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general below-cost pricing prohibitions have delved deeper than the 
federal government and carved out exceptions where below-cost 
pricing is legal.399 In addition to advancing the below-cost pricing 
discussion, these exceptions are unlikely to impede a craft brewer 
filing a claim against Big Beer. In fact, Big Beer’s anticompetitive 
activities fall outside of these state-level exceptions because they harm 
competition—not meet competition or prevent loss.400 States that 
prohibit general below-cost pricing offer the best venue for craft 
brewers because these states are unencumbered by the FTC or 
jurisdictional nuances. 
As Professor James McCall noted, the Supreme Court has never 
encountered a case that required it to decide what an appropriate 
measure of cost means.401 Without a universal federal standard, the 
circuit courts will continue developing their individual, cumbersome 
approaches—which produce inconsistent, circuit-line outcomes.402 If 
the courts continue to apply non-uniform standards, the debate over 
what constitutes an appropriate measure of cost will continue. Victims 
of predatory pricing will continue to encounter jurisdictional variance 
regarding the legality of marginal-cost pricing.403 
Without a definite standard, there is no guarantee that circuit 
courts will produce the same result under federal law. Although the 
Brooke Group test appears simple, jurisdictional requirements have 
produced a morass that makes it nearly impossible to achieve a 
positive result.404 Further, legal uncertainty will impede litigation so 
long as the Supreme Court refuses to define an appropriate measure of 
 
 399. See supra Section VI.B. 
 400. Compare supra Part III (highlighting how Big Beer has purchased competitors; restricted 
access to ingredients, distribution, and markets; and successfully lobbied for pay-to-play activities), 
with supra Section VI.B (identifying eight pervasive, bona fide exceptions—including preventing 
loss from spoilage, damaged goods, or final liquidation; selling goods on clearance, for charity, to 
government, or on court order; or pricing goods below cost to meet lawful competition). 
 401. See Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 n.1 (1993); 
see McCall, supra note 81, at 319 n.59 (discussing that the Supreme Court never resolved the cost-
standard issue). 
 402. See supra note 8 (identifying nine circuit courts that utilize some variety of AVC and two 
circuits that have not selected a measure of cost). 
 403. See Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1360 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that prices above 
AVC have a strong presumption of legality); see William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l 
Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1041 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A plaintiff may establish the required effects 
on competition in a primary-line case even though the defendant’s prices were shown to be above 
marginal cost.”); see also supra Subsection II.B.1 (explaining the practice known as marginal-cost 
pricing). 
 404. See supra Section V.B. 
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cost.405 Until something changes at the federal level, states with 
general below-cost pricing prohibitions are the best forum for craft 






 405. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–24. 
 406. Compare supra Parts IV–V (noting that the FTC does not believe that below-cost pricing 
creates monopolies and that the courts have conflicting views on how to address below-cost pricing 
claims), with supra Part VI (observing that twenty-two states have enacted general below-cost 
pricing prohibitions). 
